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ABSTRACT 
 
Within this dissertation, I examine how behaviors are affected by and affect 
education decisions. Within the first chapter, I examine how infectious disease 
impacted school enrollment behaviors in a historical context. Both the second 
and third chapters focus on college financing decisions. The second chapter 
explores how student loan uptake impacts the retirement behaviors of parents of 
students. The third chapter examines if and how large-scale merit aid 
scholarships affect student loan uptake. 
 In the first chapter, I analyze the effect of poliomyelitis outbreaks on 
school enrollment choices. This chapter adds to a growing literature on avoidance 
behavior within health economics, which focuses on how the fear of a disease 
changes behavior and creates additional costs. I find support for the idea that 
polio outbreaks resulted in lower likelihood of school enrollment for 
kindergarten-aged children and particularly for kindergarten-aged children with 
stay-at-home mothers. This result implies the channel for avoidance behavior is 
the ability to change behavior, here as a result either of a child’s age or a family’s 
income structure. 
 In the second chapter, coauthored with Celeste Carruthers, we look at an 
unstudied topic within the student loan literature: how student loans influence 
parents of students. We examine the effect of student loan presence on several 
dimensions of retirement behaviors. We find that student loan presence results in 
significantly fewer dollars in retirement savings, later expected retirement age, 
and a higher likelihood of being employed and in the labor force in some 
specifications. However, there is evidence these results are driven by 
unobservables. 
 In the third chapter, I examine the effect of large-scale merit aid programs 
on a broad measure of household debt. This debt measure includes student loan 
debt, credit card debt, medical bills, legal bills, and loans from relatives. Previous 
literature found large-scale merit aid programs result in lower a likelihood of 
student loan uptake and lower amounts of student loan debt. I employ a 
difference-in-difference strategy to exploit differences over time and states in the 
introduction of the programs. I do not find that these programs result in changes 
in student loan uptake or amount.  
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CHAPTER 1  
SOMETHING TO FEAR OTHER THAN FEAR ITSELF 
 
“… first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is 
fear itself...” 
-- Franklin D. Roosevelt 
 
“Everyone was afraid of polio, especially those who saw it all the time … In at 
least two instances during polio epidemics, hospital staff were felled by their own 
contagion of what turned out to be hysterical paralysis, brought on by fear.” 
-- Patenting the Sun, Jane S. Smith 
 
Introduction  
 
Some public health threats may be costly because these threats create anxiety 
that induces behavioral change. A public health threat with rare but severe 
outcomes may induce larger behavioral responses than anticipated from a 
rational and risk neutral populace. The economic epidemiology literature refers 
to these changes as avoidance or aversion behavior. How large could the 
avoidance behavior induced by anxiety surrounding a severe public health threat 
be? I examine this question about avoidance behavior in the context of 
poliomyelitis in mid-century America by answering a more specific question: did 
polio induce changes in five-and six-year-olds’ school enrollment behavior and, if 
so, how large were those behavioral changes?  I examine behavioral changes in 
this context because polio was a disease with a striking tail end risk (paralysis) 
the population at large was documented to be frightened of, and were particularly 
frightened of it affecting five- to nine-year-olds (Sirkin, 1960). In this case, if 
parents engaged in aversion behavior to limit their child’s exposure to polio, 
parents would limit their own child’s exposure to a peer populace where polio is 
believed to be circulating. School is the most likely place where a young child 
would be exposed to their peers, and parents would have the most discretion over 
five- and six-year-olds’ enrollment since kindergarten was optional during the 
time I examine. Further, families with stay-at-home mothers and kindergarten-
aged children would have additional discretion to keep the child at home.  
 I analyze parents’ responsiveness to the uncertainty represented by a polio 
outbreak through the impact of reported state-level polio incidence rates on 
individual enrollment decisions for kindergarten-aged children. I postulate 
avoidance behavior will be the most pronounced for families with more discretion 
over such decisions. I examine this possibility in two ways: (1) I compare the 
impact of polio on the enrollment decisions for five- and six-year-olds to the 
impact of polio on seven- and eight-year-olds and nine- and ten-year-olds and (2) 
I compare the impact of polio on five- and six-year-olds in a family with a stay-at-
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home mother to the impact of polio on five- and six-year-olds in a family with 
dual incomes. In both cases, I find evidence that families with additional 
discretion displayed more avoidance behavior, regardless of if this discretion 
stemmed from a child’s age or family structure. I conclude avoidance behavior 
can have large impacts at the individual-level and is especially pronounced when 
such behavior is relatively low cost for the individual or family.  
 The reasons for studying kindergarteners are twofold: (1) children around 
this age range were understood to be the prime age to become infected with 
symptomatic polio,1 and (2) kindergarten remains optional in most states, 
suggesting parents had additional discretion over these children’s school 
enrollment.2    
 The purpose of the analysis is to document behavioral change created by 
fear of a disease rather than to estimate the full welfare effects of this particular 
behavioral change. Such a welfare estimate would require assumptions about (1) 
if parents on average were delaying their children’s kindergarten entrance or 
skipping kindergarten enrollment all together and (2) the benefits of attending 
kindergarten in mid-century America. In a modern context, research has shown 
that enrollment decisions for this age group may have large impacts on children 
later in life. Fitzpatrick et al (2010) suggest an additional year of schooling in 
kindergarten or first grade results in a gain of a standard deviation in both 
reading and math. Berlinski et al (2008) finds that preprimary attendance 
reduces levels of grade repetition later. Attending formal kindergarten or 
remaining at home, rather than attending informal daycare, has been found to 
have positive impacts on children’s test scores in later childhood (Feinstein, 
Robertson & Symons, 1999). Cascio (2009), the one paper I am aware of that 
explores the benefits of kindergarten in a historical context, finds that increased 
kindergarten availability in the 1960s and 1970s decreased the likelihood that 
White children would be imprisoned later in life and increased the likelihood 
White children would graduate high school. She does not find similar results for 
Black children, and she does not find effects on earnings, labor supply, or the 
receipt of government benefits, possibly because kindergarten during this earlier 
time period was comparatively low intensity. Whether the results from this 
literature apply in the context of the 1940s through 1960s is an open question for 
future research.  
 What could be the educational impact be of a disease with high profile but 
rare and severe outcomes, like paralysis from polio? The highest annual polio 
case count ever recorded in the US in a year was 52,870 in 1952. The likelihood 
that a person who contracts poliovirus will be paralyzed for any length of time is 
less than 1% (Center for Disease Control, 2016). Regardless, parents checked 
newspapers daily to see if there was a polio outbreak in their community or state 
(Rustein, 1957; Smith, 1990). Schools, churches, movie theaters, and swimming 
                                                   
1 Children five- to nine-years-old were designated as the first priority group for polio vaccination 
in 1955 (Sirken & Brenner, 1960). 
2 See Table 5.3: Types of state and district requirements for kindergarten entrance and 
attendance, by state: 2014 (National Center for Education Statistics, 2015). 
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pools routinely closed for the duration of polio outbreaks (Smith, 1990). Fear of 
infectious diseases with severe outcomes has not waned since the mid-century: in 
the 1980s, a school board barred Ryan White, a hemophiliac who contracted 
AIDS, from attending school even when authorities knew the likelihood White 
would spread the disease was miniscule (Specter, 1985). Further, during the Zika 
outbreak of 2016, presidential candidates lauded the idea of quarantining 
individuals from countries with Zika outbreaks despite calls from public health 
officials such measures would have little benefit (Maron, 2016). If public health 
threats cause such anxiety, such indirect impacts only make them costlier.  
 I look at the impact of uncertainty and associated avoidance behavior 
surrounding polio on kindergarten enrollment with individual-level pooled 
ordinary least squares analysis. Using individual-level Census data from 1940, 
1950, and 1960, I determine the impact of an increase in the polio incidence rate 
in a state during the previous twelve months on the likelihood a kindergarten-age 
child will have attended kindergarten in that same state in a given time span 
prior to a reference date given by the Census. In 1950 and 1960, this time span is 
the two months before February 1; in 1940, this time span is one month before 
March 1. Following Bleakley (2007), I take this mid-year attendance as a signal of 
enrollment. I use a conservative measure of a state-year’s average 1 in 100,000 
incidence rate of polio in the twelve months before the reference date for a given 
Census. I create this average twelve-month incidence rate using weekly incidence 
rates of polio from Project Tycho (van Panhuis et al, 2013) and only include state-
years with 75% or more non-missing state-week observations. In the analyses, I 
include personal and family controls and state-level controls for education, public 
sanitation, and crude birth rates from the U.S. Census Bureau (U.S. Census 
Bureau 1942, 1943, 1946, 1952, 1953, 1962a, 1962b, & 1963).  
 In these analyses, I assume reported polio incidence rates are exogenous 
to kindergarten enrollment decisions once I condition on observables. False 
inference will result in the presence of any endogenous channel impacting both 
kindergarten enrollment and reported incidence rates. Several aspects of the 
analyses mitigate this possibility. Of foremost importance is the high variability 
of polio incidence rates in different years in each state. Polio incidence rates 
increased from 1940 to 1950, but subsequently declined with the invention of 
polio vaccines in 1955 and 1960. Although all states display this relationship, they 
do so with high levels of volatility suggesting that polio incidence rate spikes 
functioned as exogenous shocks. To guard further against the possibility of 
endogeneity, I include epidemiological drivers of polio in all analyses. In 
addition, I present falsification and robustness tests for the main analyses, and I 
show that polio has the largest impacts for children whose families had the most 
discretion over the child’s enrollment decisions.  
 I find evidence polio significantly impacted the enrollment decisions for 
the age group that mid-century parents had the most discretion over (five- to six-
year-olds). Moreover, the coefficients of interest are more significant and have 
greater magnitude when the analyses focus on families with additional flexibility 
because of the presence of a homemaker to take care of a child who is not 
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enrolled in school. Families with dual incomes do not have significant coefficients 
of interest at any level in any specification. The results of the analyses suggest 
polio created a pattern of avoidance behavior resulting in negative impacts on 
school enrollment for children in the age range to attend kindergarten. The main 
results hover between marginal significance and insignificance but suggest an 
additional new case of polio out of 100,000 people in the average week may have 
decreased kindergarten enrollment by 4 percentage points. Results for families 
with a stay-at-home mother imply that for this subpopulation, one additional 
case of population-adjusted polio in the average week decreased the likelihood a 
child would be enrolled in kindergarten by a little less than 5 percentage points. 
The implication is that avoidance behavior can be quite strong in response to an 
illness with severe but rare outcomes especially when such responses are less 
costly. 
 
Background 
 
The History of Polio 
Poliomyelitis is a viral infection that enters through the mouth and multiplies in 
the gastrointestinal tract, eventually being spread and expelled through feces. 
Polio is spread primarily through the oral-fecal route so proper sanitation 
impacts the disease’s spread.3  
 Current belief is that polio’s method of contagion (the oral-fecal route) is 
central to understanding the epidemics that arose in developed nations in the late 
nineteenth century through the mid-twentieth century. A commonly accepted 
hypothesis is that prior to modern sanitation, polio existed at subclinical levels 
throughout the population: 
In unsanitary conditions … children are more uniformly infected very early 
in life and are more likely to experience mild disease. It has been proposed 
that the late-nineteenth-century invention of modern plumbing and 
sewage containment led to the shift toward epidemic polio by preventing 
widespread infantile exposure to mild poliovirus. Once someone has been 
infected with poliovirus, lifelong immunity develops that prevents future 
reinfection. The prevention of common infantile polio subsequently 
allowed children to be infected with more virulent strains later in life. 
(Kunschner, 2008, p. 547)  
This popular theory of the polio’s sudden appearance in the late nineteenth 
century is called the hygiene hypothesis. More recently, increases in the birth rate 
in developed nations, rather than increases in public sanitation, have been 
proposed as the mechanism that gave rise to epidemic polio during the late 
nineteenth century (Martinez-Bakker & Rohani, 2015).  
 Even in a polio epidemic, paralysis is not a common outcome for infected 
individuals; polio rarely manifests itself this intensely. Out of the people in the 
                                                   
3 Some oral-oral transfer is hypothesized but is not viewed to be the main method of the disease’s 
spread (Center for Disease Control, 2016).  
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population who contract poliovirus, most (up to 72%) exhibit no symptoms 
(Center for Disease Control, 2015). Twenty-four percent of people who contract 
poliovirus experience mild symptoms including “fever, headache, and sore 
throat” (Kunschner, 2008; Center for Disease Control, 2015). Fewer than 1% of 
people with poliovirus experienced paralysis (Kunschner, 2008; Center for 
Disease Control, 2015). Further, most paralytic polio patients in mid-century 
America recovered sufficiently to live normal lives: 
Even in the relatively rare group of paralytic cases, 50 to 75 per cent of 
those afflicted recover completely without any treatment at all. An 
additional 10 to 20 per cent make fairly satisfactory recoveries. This leaves 
only a small fraction of patients who sustain grave aftereffects. (Sulkin, 
1946, p. 384) 
Notably, of those who contracted paralytic polio, 5% died from the disease 
(Kunschner, 2008).  
 Regardless of the rates of mortality or morbidity, polio epidemics were 
particularly frightening. The first recorded polio epidemic in the United States 
was in Vermont in 1843, and while there were brief lulls during the winter and 
some years, as the nineteenth century became the twentieth century, polio only 
struck more fiercely (Smithsonian Behring Center, 2016).  
 Even as new technologies, like the iron lung and rocking bed, were 
developed and lowered the case-to-death ratio, polio cases continued spreading 
with little hope the medical community could stem the tide of disease without a 
vaccine. In 1954, both Jonas Salk and Albert Sabin separately developed polio 
vaccines: Salk created a vaccine with a killed poliovirus and Sabin created a live 
polio vaccine where the poliovirus was weakened (Smithsonian Behring Center, 
2016). These vaccines were not a foolproof panacea, though they were and 
continue to be effective and were received eagerly by the populace (Smith, 1990). 
The vaccines had effectiveness rates of 60% to 90% (Sirkin & Brenner, 1960); 
while this vaccination rate is high enough to create herd immunity, it does not 
guarantee immunity when only certain individuals in the population are 
vaccinated as was the case in the early years of the vaccine. In 1957, variation in 
vaccine penetration was high as evidenced by differences between Census 
regions: 10.1% of 5- to 9-year-olds in New England were not inoculated, while 
22.7% of children in the same age group were not inoculated in the West South 
Central region. The case for universal vaccination was not helped by early vaccine 
failures. The most horrific example occurred with Cutter Manufacturing in 
California, which in 1955 did not perform Sabin’s procedure for deactivating the 
polio vaccine properly. Tragedy ensued; the Cutter incident “caused 40 000 cases 
of polio, leaving 200 children with varying degrees of paralysis and killing 10” 
(Fitzpatrick, 2006).  
 In fact, in 1957, polio eradication in the United States was far from certain 
and polio remained a real fear for many parents. A 1957 Atlantic article even 
hinted the true reliability of the Salk polio vaccine remained undetermined:  
The evidence that the presently available polio vaccine does not decrease the 
number of carriers, and the clear-cut vaccine failures, make it apparent that 
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polio will not be eradicated by this means. Unless the Salk vaccine can be 
improved, other kinds of vaccine must be developed. (Rustein, 1957) 
 
Polio & Uncertainty 
Polio’s impact on society concerned not only health outcomes but also behaviors 
and beliefs.  How sensitive were mid-century parents to polio threats? Rustein 
(1957) notes that  
Polio has its peak occurrence each summer, when parents anxiously note 
the location of each new case. In the past they have stood by helplessly 
when the disease struck nearby, watching through the passing months to 
learn whether this was a "polio year" in their town or state and breathing 
easily only when cold weather came. (Rustein, 1957) 
Rustein’s reference to a “polio year” illustrates that it was understood how noisy 
polio incidence rates could be in the same state over different years. In Figure 1, I 
present average weekly polio incidence rates for four states to demonstrate how 
spikes in polio incidence rates functioned as exogenous shocks.  
 Parental concern over the location of polio infection is central to the 
identification strategy, as awareness and conditional exogeneity of polio 
incidence rates are necessary for causal inference. Evidence points to both 
parents and communities being highly sensitive to polio outbreak location. Entire 
communities would place themselves under quarantine in the wake of a polio 
outbreak:  
In 1930 an outbreak centered in Middletown, Connecticut, caused 
Wesleyan University to cancel its football season and prompted 141 
students to quit school. That same fall, local health officials closed schools 
in Topeka, Kansas, and banned public meetings in Los Angeles, California. 
… [In the summer of 1931] Los Angeles witnessed an epidemic so severe 
the city health services began to break down. Ambulances and stretchers 
blocked the streets in front of Los Angeles County Hospital, where patients 
were turned away by frightened hospital employees. In 1935 Boston was 
hit, the entire city of Annapolis, Maryland, was quarantined, and President 
Roosevelt, himself a polio victim, called off a national Boy Scout Jamboree 
in Virginia. In 1936 churches and resorts in Alabama were closed, Chicago 
was swept by a large epidemic, and Tulsa, Oklahoma, shut down tight. 
(Smith, 1990, p. 39) 
The rare but severe outcome that everyone feared and that caused these 
disruptions was paralytic polio. Paralytic polio patients were placed behind glass 
and quarantined – they wrote messages to visitors on chalkboards. If a patient 
was paralyzed so they could no longer swallow on their own, two respiration 
tubes were installed: one for feeding and one to syphon fluid out of the lungs. If a 
patient was paralyzed so they could no longer breathe on their own, they were 
placed inside the notorious iron lung (Smith, 1990). 
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Figure 1. Average Weekly Polio Incidence Rates for One State in Each Census 
Region. 
 
 
 As previously noted, most paralytic polio patients recovered sufficiently to 
live normal daily lives. However, those patients who did not recover became 
emblematic of the horror polio could wreak:  
In 1939 a woman gave birth while in an iron lung; by that time, it had been 
proven that you could survive in an iron lung for ten years. (Smith, 1990, 
p. 39) 
Parents were afraid of an event with a low likelihood but that rare event was 
terrifying and strongly motivating toward any behavioral change that might 
lessen its likelihood.  
 
Previous Literature on Avoidance Behavior 
A large literature examines the behavioral changes and direct costs caused by 
public health threats, including the impact of threats on educational outcomes in 
historical contexts. However, much of this literature on health threats focuses on 
the direct effect of the threat, referred to as the “cost of illness” in the health 
economics literature. Cost of illness includes the impact of having an illness on 
educational outcomes, rather than the anxiety the disease creates and this 
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anxiety’s impact on educational outcomes. Bleakley (2007) examines the impact 
of hookworm, an intestinal parasite that causes fatigue but has a relatively low 
publicity profile and low mortality. The large-scale public initiative in the early 
twentieth century to treat hookworm and raise awareness of preventative 
measures resulted in significant gains in school attendance, quality of education, 
and eventual wages for those most likely to be infected with hookworm in the 
southern United States.  
While much of the health economics literature focuses on this and related 
costs of illness, there is a growing literature concerned with the costs of avoidance 
behavior in both current and historical contexts. Meyers and Thomasson (2017) 
in particular examine the impact of the 1916 polio outbreak and its associated 
school closings (a common form of communal avoidance behavior) on 
educational attainment measured later-in-life for school-aged individuals who 
would have been able to opt into the labor force but were not likely to become 
infected with poliovirus. They find that higher levels of polio mortality (a proxy 
for the likelihood of education disruptions) in a state resulted in lower later-in-
life education attainment; a one standard deviation in polio case counts per 
10,000 resulted in 0.07 fewer years of schooling, on average.  
 Much of the research examining avoidance behavior in contemporary 
contexts examines such behavior at the macro-level. Avoidance behavior in 
response to infectious disease outbreaks impacts tourism and trade the most 
severely. The outbreak of Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in Asia in 
2003 caused significant declines in GDP in China and reductions in tourism for 
all of the impacted countries (Hanna & Huang, 2004; Hai et al, 2004). Further, 
an outbreak of the plague in Surat, India in 1994 resulted in a loss of $2 billion in  
predicted trade (Cash & Narasimhan, 2000). Some of these macroeconomic 
impacts are due to the aggregation of individual decisions (for example, 
individuals deciding not to travel or purchase goods from infected countries) and 
some are the result of government’s decision (Cash & Narasimhan (2000) note 
that Bangladesh cut off trade with India prior to the official confirmation of a 
single case of plague).  I seek to add to the growing literature on micro-level 
avoidance behavior by examining the impact of polio on kindergarten enrollment. 
 
Analyses 
  
When I consider the individual impact of polio on kindergarten enrollment, I 
model the decision as a variable that takes the discrete form Ki=0 if a child who is 
kindergarten-age (5- or 6-years-old) has not attended kindergarten in the time 
period designated by the Census4 and Ki=1 if a kindergarten-age child has 
attended kindergarten.5 I model this decision using the following equation:   
Prob(Ki=1)=F ( α0+ α1δst+βωst+ρμst+λi
'
ϕ+σs+φt+εi ) 
                                                   
4 Two months prior to February 1 in 1950 and 1960, one month prior to March 1 in 1940. 
5 I take this “attendance” variable to signify enrollment, following Bleakley (2007).  
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I include fixed effects for time, φt, and state, σs, to control for state-specific and 
year-specific effects. I include state fixed effects to control for time-invariant state 
characteristics (for example, climate, because polio is a disease with a high level 
of seasonality6, and overall commitment to education). I include year fixed effects 
to control for place-invariant year characteristics: kindergarten enrollment rates 
rose between the beginning and end of the examined timespan, and polio 
outbreaks varied each year, both as new generations became susceptible and as 
new vaccines became available. These fixed effects will also control for any state-
specific and year-specific heterogeneity in reporting polio case counts. Further, I 
cluster standard errors at the state-level to account for the likelihood individuals 
rising within a state may have correlated error terms across years.   
The coefficient of interest is α1, which reflects the impact of reported polio 
incidence rates in state s in year t on the probability a child will be enrolled in 
kindergarten.  Further, I include personal and family characteristics in the vector 
λi
'
ϕ in the second and third specifications. In the secondary specification, λi
'
ϕ is a 
vector of a child’s demographic characteristics: age, race, and gender, which are 
typical to include when examining the impact of exogenous shocks on school 
attendance (Goodman, 2014; Currie et al, 2009; Fagernäs, 2015). In the third 
specification, I also include covariates controlling for household head 
characteristics and family characteristics: the occupational score of the head, if 
the head is female, if the head is employed in agriculture, if both parents are 
foreign, if the mother is present in the household, if the father is present in the 
household, the number of siblings, and if the household is in a rural area. This 
last set of covariates is based on those included by Fagernäs (2015).7  
Because head of household education data is largely unavailable for 1950, I 
include the median school years of residents 25 or older in a state s in year t as a 
proxy in vector 𝜇𝑠𝑡. Sample statistics for demographic, head of household, and 
family characteristics, as well as average weekly polio incidence rates and state-
year variables, are shown in Table 1 for each Census year. These head of 
household characteristics are included because female heads of households may 
have differing preferences for children’s education, domestic and foreign parents 
may differ in education preferences, preferences may vary over occupation, since 
parents who work in agriculture are more likely to employ their children in labor, 
and preferences may vary over income. Here income is captured by head 
occupation score, a variable created by IPUMS to represent “occupational 
economic standing” (Ruggles et al, 2017).8 In addition, I include family 
characteristics because kindergarten availability may be lower in rural areas and 
family income is likely to be correlated with education uptake.   
                                                   
6 “Seasonality” refers to the fact polio outbreaks were much more common in months with high 
temperatures than months with low temperatures. 
7 Note that unlike Fagernäs (2015), I do not include a household head’s literacy in these analyses 
because this data is unavailable in the Census years I examine. 
8 Occupational Income Score is the only income measure available for all three Census years I 
examine.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics by Census Year. 
  1940 1950 1960 
Polio Incidence Per 100,000 0.11 0.63 0.17 
Female               0.49 0.48 0.49 
Age                  5.49 5.50 5.49 
White                0.87 0.89 0.87 
Black                0.13 0.11 0.12 
Other Race           0.01 0.00 0.01 
Occupational Score of Head 21.37 23.82 23.79 
Female Head          0.06 0.06 0.07 
Head Employed in Agriculture 0.25 0.16 0.15 
Both Parents Foreign 0.09 0.05 0.06 
Father Present in Household 0.91 0.90 0.91 
Mother Present in Household 0.96 0.96 0.96 
Number of Siblings   2.73 2.14 2.49 
Rural                0.56 0.47 0.43 
Median Years of Schooling (State-Year) 8.08 9.44 9.37 
Birth Rate (State-Year) 18.43 23.82 21.09 
Percent of Homes with Running Water (State-Year) 64.78 82.78 80.16 
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 I identify the impact of polio on kindergarten enrollment by relying on 
variation in reported state-level polio incidence rates. Because of this, I include 
epidemiological factors that influence polio outbreaks in all analyses (the percent 
of the population with running water and the crude birth rate in each state-year) 
with vector 𝜔𝑠𝑡. I account for the previously mentioned “hygiene hypothesis” 
(that polio epidemics were caused by increases in sanitation) by including 
percent of dwellings in a state-year with access to running water as a proxy for 
varying sanitation levels. This is an especially important control if both sanitation 
and public school kindergarten availability are impacted by a state’s overall 
commitment to public good provision. If this is the case, the coefficient of interest 
would be biased upward, with some states having both a higher likelihood of 
kindergarten enrollment and more polio outbreaks. 
 A second hypothesis about polio’s rise is that shifting demography drove 
increases in polio. Martinez-Bakker and Rohani (2015) identify the baby boom as 
a driver of polio epidemics: rising birth rates created more asymptomatic polio 
carriers in the form of six-month-old and younger infants who then spread polio 
to other portions of the population.  To control for this possibility, I include birth 
rates by state of residence for the year t in all analyses. I also include birth rates 
for t-5 and t-6 because these lagged birth rates are likely correlated with both 
birth rates in year t and kindergarten enrollment for five- and six-year-olds in t. 
When I examine if impacts are heterogeneous by age, I include lagged birth rates 
appropriate for each age group (including the birth rate for t-7 when examining 
seven-year-olds, for example).  
I run several individual-level analyses to examine the impacts of reported 
polio incidence rates on the likelihood a five- or six-year-old will be enrolled in 
school.  
 These analyses include (1) an ordinary least squares regression including 
all kindergarten-aged children, (2) a base logistic regression including all 
kindergarten-aged children, (3) a probabilistic regression with all kindergarten-
aged children, (4) an OLS regression comparing kindergarten-aged children with 
older but proximate age groups, and (5) an OLS regression comparing families 
with a stay-at-home mother and families with two employed parents. I also 
present a falsification test and robustness checks where (1) missing state-weeks 
of polio data are included, (2) the effect of one-year polio leads on kindergarten 
enrollment is the coefficient of interest, and (3) a less flexible model is used with 
fixed effects excluded and replaced with state-year characteristics.  
 
Data 
 
To explore the impacts of the uncertainty surrounding polio, I obtained reported 
state-week disease incidence rates from Project Tycho (van Panhuis et al., 2013). 
Incidence rates are a measure of new disease case counts during a specified 
timeframe and in the Tycho data take the form:  
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Incidence Rate per 100,000 in Week W= 
Number of New Polio Cases in Week W
Estimated Population in 100,000 in Week W 
 
Using weekly disease incidence rates data, I create an average weekly 
incidence rate for a given twelve month period. I use the average weekly 
incidence rate instead of total incidence rate for the given time period because 
average weekly incidence rate will be less impacted by missing observations 
within the Tycho data than an aggregated incidence rate. However, average 
weekly incidence rates are an imperfect measure of either the stock or the flow of 
population-adjusted polio cases, and instead attempt to capture the average rate 
of appearance of new cases in the reference period. A parent’s decision to enroll 
their child in school in the wake of a polio outbreak is likely driven by how 
prevalent the disease appears to be, and this formed belief about prevalence 
might intensify (or lessen) over time if average disease incidence rates rose (or 
fell). Average weekly incidence rates then are appropriate to use because they 
give a sense of how prevalent the disease was over a period of time and on 
average how many new cases a parent was made aware of throughout the period. 
I also include base results using two different measures of polio incidence 
(estimated total yearly incidence rates in state s, the maximum weekly incidence 
rate in the past twelve months in state s, and the minimum weekly incidence rate 
in the past twelve months in state s) in Table 26 in Appendix A.  
 The reference point for the individual-level data is the Census reference 
date for the individual enrollment question: February 1 for 1950 and 1960 and 
March 1 for 1940. Because of this, the average polio incidence rate for the 
analyses is not for the calendar year but the average incidence rate from the 
February of year t-1 through the January of year t for 1950 and 1960, and the 
average incidence rate from the March of year t-1 to the February of year t for 
1940. The historic polio data that Project Tycho has digitized contains missing 
observations; I only include observations that have at least three-quarters of a 
year’s data (ie, data that is missing 13 state-week observations or fewer) on 
incidence rates in order to have a more accurate measure of the average incidence 
rate of polio. In Table 27 in Appendix A, I present results with varying thresholds 
for the number of missing state-weeks. There is an apparent tradeoff between 
observations gained and the model’s ability to fit the data (indicated by the R-
Squared) when observations in state-years with less data are included in the 
analysis. Nevertheless, results broadly agree with the results that follow. 
 I obtained individual-level micro-data for the Census from the Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-USA) website (Ruggles et al., 2017). Heads-
of-household are coded as being employed in agriculture if they are “farm, ranch, 
and other agricultural managers,” farmers or ranchers, farm laborers (including 
farm foremen, farm wage workers, unpaid family workers, or self-service farm 
laborers), or farm owners or tenants. I code respondents as living in a rural area 
if they live outside a metro area. I inflation adjust all dollar amounts used to 1960 
dollars.  
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 I obtained the percent of reporting homes without running water for the 
decennial Housing Census (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1943; U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, 1953; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1963). Crude birth rates were taken 
from the Center for Disease Control’s Vital Statistics of the United States (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, 1946, 1962b). Crude birth rate by state of residence is used 
for 1935 and later years; crude birth rate by state of occurrence is used for years 
prior to 1935 because crude birth rate by state of occurrence is unavailable for 
these years. Median years of schooling were obtained from Census records made 
available by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research 
(Haines et al, 2010; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1942; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
1952; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1962a). In the 1940 Census median years of 
schooling were calculated separately for men and women; I use the median years 
of schooling for men in the analyses, but the two are closely related (ρ=0.92).   
 
Results 
 
Main Results 
I focus on the question of how an increase in the incidence rate of polio impacted 
the likelihood a kindergarten-aged child would be enrolled in kindergarten. I 
report results for all logistic and probabilistic regressions in terms of average 
marginal effects. I report results for the OLS regression in Table 2, and I report 
results for the logistic regression in Table 3, and for the probit in Appendix A, 
Table 28. For all regressions, I present three analyses: an analysis with controls 
for polio case counts per capita, birth rates, running water controls, and state and 
year fixed effects; an analysis that adds demographic controls (age, gender, race); 
and an analysis that further controls for household and family characteristics and 
median schooling of adults in a state-year.  
In the base analysis, shown in column (1), I observe a new case of in polio 
in the average week per 100,000 people results in a 3 to 4 percentage point 
reduction in the likelihood a child will attend kindergarten but this result borders 
on insignificance, especially once a rich panel of covariates is added. The size of 
this coefficient is comparable to the magnitude of having a female head of 
household in absolute terms, or approximately half of the size of the impact of 
living in a rural area where there might be lower kindergarten availability overall. 
 The main analysis with all coefficients, outside of state and year fixed 
effects are reported in Appendix A, Table 29.  I report OLS as the main analysis 
because the logistic regression, while it may be better suited to binary outcomes, 
may suffer from the incidental parameters problem because of the large number 
of fixed effects in the model. 
 Logistic regressions are what has been traditionally used within the school 
enrollment literature. I therefore present these results as well in Table 3. These 
results imply that a 1.0 increase in the average polio incidence lowers the 
likelihood a child would attend kindergarten by 4.6 percentage points in column 
(3). To compare the magnitude of this result to that of other variables, the 
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Table 2. Pooled OLS Regression of the Impact of Polio Incidence Rate on the 
Likelihood of Kindergarten Attendance for Five- and Six-Year-Olds. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Polio Incidence Per 100,000 -0.041 -0.041* -0.035 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
R2 0.14 0.34 0.35 
N 95,839 95,839 95,839 
State & Year Fixed Effects x x x 
Epidemiological Controls x x x 
Demographic Characteristics  x x 
Head of Household & Family 
Characteristics 
  x 
Median Years of School Control   x 
Family Characteristics     x 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 3. Pooled Logistic Regression of the Impact of Polio Incidence Rate on the 
Likelihood of Kindergarten Attendance for Five- and Six-Year-Olds. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Polio Incidence Per 100,000 -0.062** -0.051** -0.046** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Log Pseudolikelihood -5,435,139.15 -4,335,417.08 -4,267,705.38 
N 95,839 95,839 95,839 
State & Year Fixed Effects x x x 
Epidemiological Controls x x x 
Demographic Characteristics  x x 
Head of Household & Family 
Characteristics 
  x 
Median Years of School 
Control 
  x 
Family Characteristics   x 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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average marginal effect of a child living in a rural area is a 7.5 percentage point 
reduction in the likelihood that child would attend kindergarten, all else equal, 
and the average marginal effect of a child with a head of household employed in 
agriculture results in a 4.0 percentage point reduction. Thus, the impact of a 
polio outbreak during the year can be a large impact, comparable to a reduction 
in the availability of kindergarten or the willingness of a parent to lose an 
additional farmhand.  
 
Heterogeneous Effects by Age 
If the non-mandatory nature of kindergarten is what is driving the results 
because parents have greater ability to change their behaviors for this particular 
age group, then other proximately aged children whose schooling is mandatory 
should show a different pattern of results. Table 4 reports results when looking at 
different age bands close to five- and six-year-olds: seven- and eight-year-olds 
and nine- and ten-year-olds. For the other age bands, I find consistently 
insignificant results. This could indicate polio was a disease of particular concern 
to parents of young children, and parents were particularly responsive when 
schooling was not required. 
 I take these results to point to the idea that parents with additional 
flexibility because a child was younger (and therefore less likely to be subject to a 
state’s compulsory education law) were more likely to keep the child out of 
school. Another margin that might indicate additional flexibility to keep a child 
home from school in the wake of a polio outbreak is the presence of a stay-at-
home mother in the family, which I examine in the next section.  
 
Heterogeneous Effects by Maternal Employment 
In addition to the age of a child granting parents additional discretion over school 
enrollment decisions, parental employment may also impact the decision to 
enroll or not enroll a child in school. To examine this possibility, I analyze the  
enrollment patterns of two different types of family employment structures: 
families with a stay-at-home mother who has not had another occupation in at 
least the last year and families with dual incomes. Focusing on these long-term 
stay-at-home mothers removes the possibility a working mother quit her job to 
stay at home with her children because of a polio outbreak. Instead, the implied 
channel is that some families have more flexibility about school enrollment 
decisions than others because of the previous presence of a homemaker.  
 Results shown in Table 5 imply that the impact of polio incidence varies by 
maternal employment: coefficients for families with long-term homemakers 
consistently have larger impacts and greater precision than families with two 
employed parents; the families with an available homemaker seem to be the 
families driving the analysis. Results imply that one additional case of polio in the 
average week out of 100,000 people decreased the likelihood a child would be 
enrolled in kindergarten by more than 4.5 percentage points if that child was in a 
family with a stay-at-home mother. An additional way to view these results is that 
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Table 4. OLS Regression of the Impact of Polio Incidence Rates on the Likelihood 
of School Enrollment for Seven- and Eight-Year-Olds, and Nine- and Ten-Year-
Olds.  
7 & 8 Year Olds 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Polio Incidence Per 100,000 0.008 0.008 0.004 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 
N 92,839 92,839 92,839 
9 & 10 Year Olds 
  (4) (5) (6) 
Polio Incidence Per 100,000 -0.013 -0.012 -0.014 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
R2 0.05 0.05 0.05 
N 90,217 90,217 90,217 
State & Year Fixed Effects x x x 
Epidemiological Controls x x x 
Demographic Characteristics  x x 
Head of Household & Family Characteristics   x 
Median Years of School Control   x 
Family Characteristics   x 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. Pooled OLS Regression of the Impact of Polio Incidence Rates on the 
Likelihood of Kindergarten Attendance for Five- and Six-Year-Olds, with 
Separate Analysis for Families with Long-Term Homemakers, and Families with 
Two Working Parents. 
Mother Not in the Labor Force 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Polio Incidence Per 100,000 -0.060** -0.053** -0.046** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
R2 0.13 0.36 0.37 
N 61,518 61,518 61,518 
Both Parents in Labor Force 
  (4) (5) (6) 
Polio Incidence Per 100,000 -0.014 -0.038 -0.027 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
R2 0.14 0.32 0.33 
N 10,086 10,086 10,086 
State & Year Fixed Effects x x x 
Epidemiological Controls x x x 
Demographic Characteristics  x x 
Head of Household & Family 
Characteristics 
  x 
Median Years of School Control   x 
Family Characteristics   x 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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if the polio incidence rate increased by one standard deviation (.24 for the 
sample), the likelihood a child with a stay-at-home mother would be enrolled in 
kindergarten would drop by 1.08 percentage points. These results bolster the 
argument that that the impact of polio incidence is driven by parental discretion 
when faced with a health threat: parents with additional flexibility to keep a child 
at home, either because of a child’s age or because there is a person available to 
take care of the child, are more likely to display behavioral changes in response to 
polio outbreaks.  
 
Falsification Tests & Robustness Checks 
To ensure that results are caused by exogenous shocks to public health 
uncertainty driven by polio outbreaks and not other mechanisms, I present 
results in Table 6 where I use one-year leading polio incidence rates instead of 
current year polio incidence rates. The results are insignificant with smaller 
coefficients than the main results. I take these findings to indicate that polio case 
counts are exogenous with respect to kindergarten enrollment once state-level 
covariates are included in the analyses. Presented in Table 7 are analyses that 
control for the number of missing weeks in each state-year. A possible 
relationship between state data quality and kindergarten availability could exist if 
states with better infrastructure both provide more kindergarten and more 
reliably report polio cases. Results do not indicate data quality is what drives the 
results: the number of missing weeks are not significant predictors of 
kindergarten enrollment, and controlling for the number of missing weeks results 
in similar coefficients as the main analyses. 
  In addition to these robustness checks, within Appendix A I present 
analyses without epidemiological controls (Table 30) and without state fixed 
effects (Table 31), respectively. Results are more significant when epidemiological 
controls are excluded. and are insignificant and positive when state fixed effects 
are excluded. 
 
Conclusion 
 
These analyses indicate polio could have had large impacts on families with the 
greatest ability to change their behavior – families with children whose schooling  
was optional and with a person already at home to stay with a child. If this is the 
case, what explains the increased uncertainty and fear surrounding poliomyelitis?
 First, polio’s mode of transmission is the oral-fecal route. This 
differentiates it from other childhood diseases like measles, mumps, or pertussis, 
which are spread through cough. These diseases’ modes of transmission are also 
their major symptom. Because there is a difference between polio’s mode of 
transmission and its symptoms, parents cannot readily observe who is infected 
(or contagious) in a child’s class or community or even the infection status of 
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Table 6. Falsification Test: Pooled OLS Regression of Impact of One Year Leading 
Polio Incidence Rates on Kindergarten Enrollment.  
  (1) (2) (3) 
One Year Leading Polio Incidence 
Per 100,000 
-0.041 -0.030 -0.027 
 (0.047) (0.048) (0.043) 
R2 0.14 0.34 0.35 
N 95,369 95,369 95,369 
State & Year Fixed Effects x x x 
Epidemiological Controls x x x 
Demographic Characteristics  x x 
Head of Household & Family 
Characteristics 
  x 
Median Years of School Control   x 
Family Characteristics     x 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 7. Robustness Check: Pooled OLS Regression of Impact of Polio Incidence 
Rates on Kindergarten Enrollment with Number of Missing Weeks of Polio 
Observations.  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Polio Incidence Per 100,000 -0.041 -0.042* -0.035 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.021) 
Missing Weeks Included 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
R2 0.14 0.34 0.35 
N 95,839 95,839 95,839 
State & Year Fixed Effects x x x 
Epidemiological Controls x x x 
Demographic Characteristics  x x 
Head of Household & Family 
Characteristics 
  x 
Median Years of School Control   x 
Family Characteristics     x 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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their own child. A parental reaction to keep a child out of school makes sense 
when thinking of ways individuals choose to delineate boundaries even when 
such boundaries may not be statistically useful:  
[A disease’s] crossing of boundaries is essential to the creation of panic. 
When the edge of safety cannot be defined, people react in ways that are 
not necessarily rational—cordoning off suspect populations; creating 
artificial boundaries that create the illusion of safety; fleeing somewhere, 
anywhere. (Humphreys, 2002) 
Second, as discussed in the above section, polio is a relatively recent disease. This 
newness may have made polio more threatening: mid-century parents witnessed 
polio outbreaks growing more frequent and on a larger scale throughout their 
lifetimes until the introduction of the polio vaccines. Third, polio may have been 
especially frightening because of the associated paralysis and the fact that polio 
primarily attacks children, possibly handicapping or scarring them for life 
(Dredge, 2008). Perhaps as a result, polio became the focus of a massive media 
campaign for eradication in the 1900’s:  
… in 1938 [Franklin Delano] Roosevelt helped found the National 
Foundation for Infantile Paralysis (known later as the March of Dimes) 
that raised millions of dollars for the rehabilitation of those who suffered 
from paralytic polio and later invested heavily in funding the research that 
led to effective polio vaccines. (Dredge, 2008, p. 552) 
All of these reasons indicate that polio was much more in the public eye and 
imagination than other childhood diseases. It is possible that the culmination of 
this publicity and associated notoriety resulted in pronounced avoidance 
behavior, especially among families where such avoidance behavior was less 
costly. These results highlight the real impacts that uncertainty surrounding 
public health can create, and that some populations will be most likely to exhibit 
this behavior: populations both directly affected by the disease and populations 
with flexibility to enact such behavior with lower costs. 
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CHAPTER 2  
DEBT PLUS: COULD STUDENT LOANS IMPACT PARENTS’ 
RETIREMENT? 
 
Introduction 
 
Student loans have come to the forefront of national attention in recent years, 
and a burgeoning economic literature investigates loans’ impacts on borrowers’ 
outcomes. This emergence of literature and attention is not surprising: total 
student loan debt (including Perkins, Stafford, PLUS,9 and nonfederal loans) has 
remained above $100 billion in constant 2013 dollars since the 2007-2008 
academic year. Inflation-adjusted debt per student rose by 35% from 2004 to 
2013, and the number of borrowers increased 86% during the same timeframe 
(Trends in Student Aid, 2014). These statistics take into account all student loans 
taken out by both parents of students and students themselves, but the student 
loan literature thus far has focused mainly on federal Stafford loans or the 
means-tested Perkins loans and their effect on student borrowers. Little research, 
economic or otherwise, has been dedicated to how student loan uptake impacts 
parents. Parents may be directly impacted by taking out student loans to fund 
their child’s education, or they may be indirectly impacted by supporting their 
children through the loan repayment process. Student loans could then possibly 
create intergenerational transfers of wealth that may be unplanned and may be 
particularly risky as a parent approaches retirement age. This possibility opens 
up economic questions: does student loan uptake delay parents’ retirement or 
decrease their retirement savings? We examine this question by looking at 
student loan presence within a household (which includes both debt taken out by 
parents for students and debt taken out by any students that reside within the 
household) on several measures of retirement behavior, expectations, and 
savings.   
  PLUS loans, the most common loan parents take out, made up 12% of all 
federal and nonfederal loan dollars in the 2016-2017 school year (Trends in 
Student Aid, 2017). During this time frame the average PLUS loan recipient 
borrowed 2.4 times more than the average federal Stafford loan recipient (Trends 
in Student Aid, 2017). Figure 2 illustrates the percent of parents borrowing PLUS 
loans and the average dollar amount borrowed from a sample of college students’ 
families interviewed by Sallie Mae. Despite the fact that PLUS loan use is 
relatively common, little information is publicly available about the repayment, 
default, and deference rates of PLUS loans, unlike federal loans disbursed to 
students (Fishman, 2018).  
 In this paper, we examine the effect of student loan presence in the 
household on parents’ employment status, retirement expectations, and 
retirement preparation. Using a rich data set that links parents to children and  
                                                   
9 Stafford and Perkins loans are federal student loans made to students; PLUS loans are federal 
student loans made to parents or graduate students.  
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Figure 2. Percent of Families Borrowing PLUS Loans and the Amount of PLUS 
Loans Borrowed Interviewed in Sallie Mae’s “How America Pays for College.”10 
 
 
those children to their undergraduate institutions, we measure the effect of 
student loans on parental labor force participation, employment status, expected 
retirement age, the gap between the age a parent expects to retire and the age she 
believes others at her same job retire, and dollars in a family’s individual 
retirement accounts (IRAs). The main concern with a simple regression model to 
calculate the effect of uptake on these variables is that parents in families where 
student loans are present may differ from parents in families where student loans 
are not present in a systematic way that affects outcomes of interest. We account 
for the possibility of omitted variable bias in three ways: (1) we include a robust 
set of control variables about the child’s institution and control variables 
correlated with retirement behaviors, (2) we examine if taking out student loans 
in the present period is correlated with money problems in a past period that 
would not affect student loan eligibility, and (3) we compare our unconditional 
results with results that include this robust set of controls and formally evaluate 
the potential threat from unobservables using a technique developed by Oster 
(2017).  
 The question of the relationship between student loan debt and retirement 
is timely because not only has student loan debt in general come to the forefront 
of national attention, but there is widespread concern that Baby Boomers retiring 
will affect the economy at large (Casselman, 2014). Baby Boomers are also more 
indebted than previous generations, and that indebtedness has led to less 
financial security (Lusardi, Mitchell, & Oggero, 2017). This paper links these 
                                                   
10 (Sallie Mae, multiple years) 
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topics in an attempt to shed light on the ramifications of student loan presence in 
a household on parents. 
 The most striking results we find concern dollars in a household’s 
Individual Retirement Accounts. The results indicate a significant reduction in 
IRA dollars for borrowers: a household with any student loan debt on average 
has $70,000 fewer dollars in IRAs than a household without student loans. 
Moreover, results imply an additional $10,000 in student loan debt reduces IRA 
savings by $14,000. Neither the presence nor amount of student loans affect the 
likelihood a family will have an IRA. Results also indicate an additional $10,000 
of student loan debt increases a parent’s expected retirement age by 5 months. 
The presence of any student loan debt increases the likelihood a parent will be 
employed by 5.5 percentage points and increases the likelihood a parent will be in 
the labor force by 5.4 percentage points, but the employment status coefficients 
are only marginally significant. Robustness checks and a formal check for 
robustness developed by Emily Oster (2017) suggest that these results could be 
driven by unobservable differences between families who borrow and families 
that do not. 
 
Background & Previous Literature 
 
PLUS Background 
Although we focus on the effect of all student debt within a household, PLUS loan 
debt, the type of debt taken out directly by parents, and its mechanics may be less 
familiar. To this end, this section briefly explains this particular type of debt. 
PLUS loans are available to both parents and graduate students, but we focus on 
the implications of PLUS loans for parents. 
 Like other federal student loans, PLUS loans are not collateralized debt 
nor does an application require an income check. However, PLUS loans differ 
from other federal loans in two main ways: (1) a PLUS loan requires a separate 
application that includes a credit check and (2) the amount a PLUS loan recipient 
can borrow is determined by an institution’s cost of attendance rather than a 
dollar amount set by the federal government.  
 The credit check required for PLUS loan receipt is only a check for adverse 
credit history, not a check to examine repayment ability. Moreover, the credit 
check simply approves or denies a parent for access to the loan rather than for a 
specific loan amount.  
 The loan amounts offered to approved PLUS recipients can be extremely 
high because the loan covers the cost of attending a university less any other aid. 
Cost of attendance is determined by a university itself, and can include indirect 
expenses (such as travel) as well as direct expenses (such as tuition, room, and 
board). PLUS loans thus offer parents an opportunity to fill the gap between the 
aid their child has received (including any loans taken out by the child) and the 
cost of attending a university. However, this opportunity also means that an 
education may make families indebted over multiple generations, with a student 
taking out the maximum amount of loans they can and then parents borrowing 
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the rest (Fishman, 2018). Dependent students could only borrow $31,000 in 
Stafford loans in their total college career in 2016; no aggregate limit existed for 
PLUS loans. Further, the interest rates on PLUS loans are typically much higher 
than Staffords: for the 2016-2017 school year, the interest rate on PLUS loans 
was 7.00% and the interest rate on Stafford loans was 4.45%. Thus, PLUS loans 
allow parents to borrow large levels of debt that compound faster than the loans 
offered to students, with no attempt to estimate a parent’s repayment ability. 
 
Previous Literature 
Although student loans are frequently portrayed in the media as an unmitigated 
burden, this debt conforms to economists’ lifecycle consumption hypothesis. The 
lifecycle consumption hypothesis predicts individuals will acquire debt early in 
life, pay the debt back by midlife, and begin saving for retirement. This 
consumption-smoothing benefit of Stafford and Perkins student loans is believed 
to outweigh their costs for most individuals (Webber, 2016). Regardless, 
numerous studies have documented larger behavioral change than theoretically 
predicted in the presence of student loan debt (Field, 2009; Minicozzi, 2004; 
Rothstein & Rouse, 2010; Cooper & Wang, 2014).  
On the other hand, parents do not anticipate any consumption-smoothing 
properties due to student loan uptake. Anecdotally, it seems common for 
students to promise to pay back the loans themselves even though the debt is in 
their parent’s name (Rhode, 2015). At most, PLUS loans are then a second best 
solution to Staffords or a supplement to Staffords.  
 Parental contributions (including PLUS loans and other forms of 
borrowing, as well as funding education through income or assets) make up the 
largest portion of student aid (Sallie Mae, 2015). There is a small amount of 
literature on the interaction of parental aid and student aid or outcomes, but as 
far as the authors are aware there is no literature on the effect of parental aid or 
student loans on parents. Scott-Clayton and Zafar (2016) find that West 
Virginia’s PROMISE merit aid scholarship decreased the amount of loans taken 
out by parents by less than $1,000, but this result is statistically significant only 
for some subpopulations (female students, non-Pell recipients, and public high 
school students) and not significant for the total population. Stolper (2014) found 
that parents with access to increased credit, specifically a Homeowner Equity 
Line of Credit, are more likely to send their child to a more selective school and 
push renters’ children out of these more selective schools. Further, children 
whose parents are providing some source of their aid are more likely to stay in 
school but also have lower GPAs than students whose parents are not 
contributing financially (Hamilton, 2013).  
Why would a parent borrowing for education produce different impacts on 
retirement than parents funding education through their income or savings? We 
posit the difference is planning. For large portions of borrowing families, 
borrowing was unanticipated: 30% of borrowing families Sallie Mae (2015) 
interviewed had not planned to borrow for college. This much unexpected debt 
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late in life may distort parents’ labor market choices, especially when many older 
Americans are uninformed about their own retirement preparedness.11 
 A small literature on later-in-life debt confirms this intuition. Anguelov 
and Tamborini (2009) emphasize that deviating from the lifecycle consumption 
path (either from an individual miscalculating their own trajectory or unplanned 
life events) through accruing late-in-life debt may impact individuals in a variety 
of ways:  
Servicing high levels of debt while working may hinder a family’s ability to 
save for retirement. … Debt service obligations could lead individuals to 
work longer. Debt may also reduce the longevity of a household’s 
accumulated financial assets and savings, which would have to be spent 
down to repay debt when income is limited. Indebtedness, especially from 
high-interest consumer borrowing, could also leave elderly persons with 
fewer retirement resources in the face of health and other income shocks. 
(p.14) 
A working paper from the Center of Retirement Research at Boston College finds 
support for this view. Butrica and Karamcheva (2013) examine the effect of 
indebtedness and liquidity constraints on nondisabled older adults’ (those who 
are aged 62 to 69) joint decisions of retirement and Social Security uptake 
through a bivariate probit model. Butrica and Karamcheva look at overall debt, 
mortgage debt, and credit card debt. They find all three debt measures increase 
the likelihood an individual will be working and decrease the likelihood of Social 
Security benefit uptake. Their results imply that having any debt makes an 
individual 8 percentage points more likely to work, having mortgage debt makes 
an individual 7 percentage points more likely to work, and having any credit card 
debt makes an individual 4 percentage points more likely to work. Additionally, 
they use instruments for mortgage debt to try and determine the effect of debt on 
retirement and benefit uptake with better identification. Even when using 
instruments, they find mortgage debt to be a significant predictor of employment.  
 Mann (2011) estimates the impact of debt on retirement decisions using a 
multivariate model with individual-level fixed effects. The results confirm 
intuition: individuals with higher debt levels delay retirement longer. She finds 
this impact is lessened for those with higher wealth levels. 
 
Economic Model & Methodology 
 
To examine the specific effect of student loan debt, we adapt a simple economic 
model employed by Butrica and Karamcheva (2013). The model relates liquidity 
constraints to retirement decisions and includes controls for demographic and 
economic characteristics. Butrica and Karamcheva use a bivariate probit to model 
the effect of household debt on labor force participation and Social Security 
                                                   
11 Munnel et al (2017) estimate that 52% of U.S. households in the 2013 Survey of Consumer 
Finances are underprepared financially for retirement, and 19% of U.S. households believe they 
are prepared for retirement and are not. 
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uptake as a joint decision.12 We instead solely examine the effect of student loan 
debt on employment status, retirement savings, and retirement expectations 
regressands separately. The model for individual i with children who attend 
colleges with aggregate characteristics u is thus 
Yi= Xiβ+Lciγ+Kuρ 
 Here, Yi is a parental outcome of interest: employment status (employed, 
unemployed, not in the labor force, or retired), expected retirement age, distance 
from parent’s own expected retirement age and the age they believe others with 
their same job retire at, presence of IRA/annuity savings within the household, or 
dollars in an IRA/annuity for the entire household. For the employment status 
variables and presence of an IRA account, Yi  is the realized outcome of a latent 
variable Yi
* where  Yi =1[Yi
*
>0] . For the other continuous variables, Yi itself is the 
outcome of interest. Following Butrica and Karamcheva (2013), Xi is a vector of 
economic and demographic data about person i. Lci contains information about a 
household’s liquidity constraints, specifically a household’s student loan debt. We 
include aggregate measures of a parent’s children’s college exposure rather than 
individual parent-child pairs because we do not want the analysis to be driven by 
parents with multiple children when the effect we investigate is on the parent 
rather than the child. We include number of children and total number of years a 
child has gone to school, however, to account for the fact that some parents are 
exposed to the choice about borrowing for a child’s education multiple times and 
to account for the number of years a parent could be borrowing to fund.  
 We include these institutional characteristics because the literature on 
student loan debt has also found that individuals who attend some school types 
are more likely to have higher levels of debt. Private and for-profit schools are 
associated with higher debt levels for students than public schools, and four year 
colleges are associated with higher debt levels than two year colleges (Chen & 
Wiederspan, 2015; Cellini & Darolia, 2016). Schools in the private and for-profit 
sectors also tend to have higher average PLUS loan disbursements and a higher 
percentage of students receiving parental PLUS loans (Dancy, 2016). In addition, 
students at historical black colleges and universities (HBCUs) have been found to 
be take out more loans than students at non-HBCU schools (Hackett, 2016).  For 
these reasons, we include 𝐾𝑢, a vector of data about the colleges that parent i’s 
children attended: number of children that attended college a parent was 
matched with, the latest child’s first entrance year, the total number of years of 
college a parent’s children have attended, and categorical variables for the 
percent of a parent’s children (“all,” “some,” or “none”) that began college at a 
private school, public school, for-profit school, 4-year school, and historical black 
college.13 We include the latest child’s first entrance year because it is likely that 
                                                   
12 Only 29% of our sample is eligible for social security (age ≥ 62) compared to all of Butrica & 
Karemcheva’s sample. 
13 We use categorical variables for these percentages rather than the percentages themselves 
because data from the restricted data set we use is only allowed to be reported if cells have more 
than 11 observations. The categorical variables meet this standard; the percentages themselves 
have too few observations per cell. 
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when a child first attends college is when a parent makes the decision to fund the 
child’s education with loans or not.  
 We perform a simple OLS analysis using cross sections of the latest data 
available for a parent from the Panel Study of Income Dyanmics. The key threat 
to identification in this case is omitted variable bias: parents in households with 
student loans could differ systematically from parents in households without. In 
order for the coefficient of interest to be unbiased and consistent, we require the 
systematic part of the outcome variable  Yi to be uncorrelated with the 
unsystematic part of the outcome variable. In practice, this means that if the 
underlying process generating the outcome 𝑌𝑖 is     
Yi= Xiβ+Lciγ++Kuρ+Fiϑ 
where there is some omitted variable Fi for which  E(Lci|Fi)≠0 then the zero 
conditional mean assumption has been violated. If this happens, the coefficients 
produced by OLS are inconsistent and biased. In other words, the results 
produced may not capture the causal effect of loan presence on parents’ decisions 
but spurious correlation between loan presence and retirement behaviors. 
 This possibility requires serious consideration about how to address it. 
First, we include control variables for which we believe the conditions above will 
hold.  These controls include those considered by Butrica and Karamcheva 
(2013): parental demographic characteristics (sex, age, if the respondent has 
reached the age for Social Security uptake, and race and ethnicity), if a spouse is 
present, reported health status, wealth and income information (the family 
income excluding individual i’s labor income, and household assets) and state of 
residence. We differ from Butrica and Karamcheva in three ways: (1) we use the 
age of Social Security eligibility (62) rather than the Full Retirement Age for 
Social Security (65) because our sample skews much younger, (2) we do not 
include data on spousal income or retirement status because these fields are 
collinear with spouse presence within the PSID data, and (3) we use state rather 
than Census region because this more granular location data is available in the 
PSID.  
 We include additional controls in the robustness checks: a measure of 
financial literacy and the education of the parent’s mother in one robustness 
check, and a measure of a household’s earliest wealth in another.14 We assume 
that a parent’s maternal education is a proxy for a parent’s taste for education 
and other unobservables that may drive labor market behaviors. A parent with a 
higher taste for education may be more likely to fund their child’s education; 
further, parental education has also been shown to have a significant effect on 
labor market outcomes, perhaps because it represents unobservable traits with 
value in the labor market (Agnarsson & Carlin, 2002; Hudson & Sessions, 2011). 
Financial literacy has been shown to be positively related to retirement planning 
behaviors and wealth accumulation (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007).  Financial 
                                                   
14 These controls reduce the sample size further, so we include them as robustness checks and also 
only include the employment status regressions; for the other regressions, sample size falls below 
400. 
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literacy may be correlated with PLUS loans in particular in two ways: (1) parents 
with greater dedication to their child’s education, i.e. those who borrow education 
loans, may prioritize their own education (including financial literacy), and (2) 
financial literacy may matter especially for financial instruments parents are 
unfamiliar with and instruments for which there is no income requirement and a 
comparatively weak credit check, such as PLUS loans. If (1) holds, then the 
coefficient of interest (the effect of student loan presence on retirement behavior) 
would be biased downward. If (2) holds, the coefficient of interest would be 
biased upward. In addition to these controls, we make use of a technique 
developed by Emily Oster (2017).  
 Within the economics literature, coefficient stability is frequently taken as 
a signal that a coefficient is robust and has approached its “true” unbiased value. 
Oster (2017) points out that only considering coefficient stability and not R2 
movements neglects to consider the possibility that the additional control a 
coefficient is “robust” to may not be instrumental in explaining variation in the 
model at all – and thus the coefficient of interest’s stability is not indicative of its 
unbiasedness but of the small effect the additional control has on the model.  
 To propose formal tests of robustness, Oster (2017) relies on the simple 
setup 
Y= βX+Ψω0+W2+ε 
Here, ω0 defines a vector of controls, W2 defines a vector of unobservables, and X 
is the coefficient of interest (“treatment”). She also denotes Ψω0= W1. Assume 
W2 and W1 are orthogonal. For i = 1, 2, the variance of Wi and the cov(X, Wi)  are 
denoted σi
2 and σiX, respectively. Oster proposes a “coefficient of proportionality,” 
δ, such that 
δ
σ1X
σ1
2 =
σ2X
σ2
2 . 
Oster shows that δ can be interpreted as the degree of selection based on 
unobservables necessary within an estimation for the effect of treatment (here, 
the effect of student loan debt) to be explained away. The δ parameter estimated 
takes into account not only coefficient stability but also R2 movements. This δ 
provides an intuitive way to imagine selection bias if we assume a maximum15 R2 
and β: δ = 3 implies that the selection process would need to rely three times 
more on unobservable variables rather than observable variables for the 
treatment effect, β, to equal zero. In addition, it is possible for δ to be negative, 
but in this case implications about robustness are less clear. In these results, δ < 
0 is associated with either (1) the coefficient of interest from the conditional 
results is in fact further from zero than the coefficient of interest from the naïve 
results (i.e., those that do not include control variables) or (2) the coefficient of 
interest is insignificant. The literature surrounding the δ coefficient is still being 
formed; we thus do not attempt to interpret any δ < 0 as indicating the presence 
or absence of selection bias.  
                                                   
15 Oster points out the possible R2 for a given estimation is unlikely to be 1 “since in many settings 
there is likely to be some idiosyncratic variation in outcome—and more importantly, the degree of 
this is likely to vary…” (p. 5). 
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 From this, Oster derives a bias-adjusted β for which δ is assumed to be a 
specific value (i.e., selection on unobservables and observables is assumed to be a 
specific ratio). In the following analyses, we follow Oster’s suggestions and when 
calculating δ, we assume β = 0, i.e. we estimate the degree of selection based on 
unobservables necessary for the effect of student loan debt on parents to be 
explained away entirely.  When calculating the bias-adjusted β, we assume δ=1 
(unobservables drive selection proportional to observables). For both 
calculations, we must assume a maximum R2 (the amount of variation within the 
data that can be explained). We follow Oster’s suggestion and assume R2max is 1.3 
times the conditional R2. Oster suggests two formal standards for determining 
the robustness of a coefficient of interest when the inclusion of controls moves β 
further from 0, as happens in our analyses. These formal robustness tests are (1) 
if δ is greater than 1, and (2) if the bias-adjusted β is within 2.8 standard errors of 
the controlled β.16 
 
Data 
 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
To perform the analyses, we use individual- and household-level data from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is a longitudinal study of 
families in the United States. The PSID began collecting survey data about these 
families in 1968; originally 5,000 families were surveyed. The PSID surveyed 
more than 9,000 families in 2015, a result of new populations being added to the 
PSID (for example, a sample of 2,000 Latino households was added in 1990) and 
also the formation of new families when children create their own households 
(Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 2017). Surveys were given annually from 1968 
to 1997 and once every two years from 1999 onward.  
 The PSID survey given to a family always consists of at least two portions: 
the Main Family survey and the Individual survey. The PSID collects data about 
members of a Family Unit who reside in the interviewed household.  Each 
member in the Family Unit is identified in relation to the household’s Head. The 
household Head is identified as the main income earner in the household, unless 
that main income earner is a female with a legal or cohabiting male partner, in 
which case that male partner is considered the Head and the female partner is 
considered the legal or cohabiting Spouse.17 These Family Units can and do 
change over the course of the survey as people split off from the family and form 
their own households.  
 Coverage (i.e., which family members questions are asked about) differs by 
question, rather than by family, for both the Main Family and Individual survey. 
Within the Main Family survey, data is collected for the entire Family Unit (for 
example, the amount of IRA/annuity assets in total for all members of the Family 
                                                   
16 “+/− 2.8 standard errors is the bounds of the 99.5% confidence interval…” (Oster, 2017).  
17 See the Panel Study of Income Dynamics’ Frequently Asked Questions (2018) for more 
information about the selection process. 
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Unit) or only for the household Head and the Head’s Spouse (for example, the 
labor income for the Head two years ago, and the labor income for the Spouse 
two years ago). The Individual survey collects information about all members of 
the Family Unit (for example, an individual’s relationship to the Head) or only 
about the individual answering the survey questions as well as the designated 
Head and Spouse (for example, an individual’s reported health status). 
 In addition to these main questionnaires, families may also be given 
supplemental questionnaires meant to explore specific topics. Of particular 
relevance to this paper is the Transition to Adulthood (TA) supplement, a 
rotating survey that began in 2005. Prior to 2017, the survey was given each year 
to young adults (individuals between the ages of 18 and 28) who had previously 
responded to the Child Development Supplement (CDS), a supplemental survey 
about the resources (financial, time, and social-psychological) of children under 
the age of 18. Beginning in 2017, the Transition to Adulthood survey was given to 
all young adults in the PSID. 
 We detail the use and treatment of parent-child pairs, the coefficient of 
interest (student loan debt), the outcome variables (labor market status, 
retirement expectations, cash assets, and IRA assets), and important controls 
(information on the postsecondary institutions a parent was exposed to) below. 
The treatment of all other covariates is detailed in Table 32 in Appendix B.  
 In order to create aggregate measures of institutional exposure (for 
example, the percent of a parent’s children whose first college entrance was at a 
historical Black college), we first link each child to each parent. We only include 
observations for which a parent-child pairing can be identified using the Main 
Family survey. The Main Family survey identifies the mother and father of an 
individual with unique individual identifiers if the mother and father also have 
been in the PSID. These unique individual identifiers were then used to link other 
information from the PSID about the parent or child to the parent-child pair. 
Within the Main Family data, state of residence is collected each survey year. We 
only include observations whose state of residence is known and within the 
United States.  
 The education data the PSID collects is central to this study. Both the Main 
Family survey and the Transition to Adulthood survey collect education 
information, including dates of college entry (for the Transition to Adulthood 
survey) and college exit (for the Transition to Adulthood and Main Family 
survey). For our study, information on the year a child began attending college is 
necessary because we assume the first year a child attends college is when a 
parent makes the decision to fund their child’s education with parental loans or 
not. We  use college entry and exit dates from both the Main Family and 
Transition to Adulthood surveys to maximize sample size,18 but the two surveys 
ask different questions about college entry and exit dates, so the treatment of the 
                                                   
18 Individuals whose college entry or exit years are ascertained by one survey are not necessarily 
ascertained by the other. 
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data varies by which survey the data comes from. We outline these differences 
below.  
 The Transition to Adulthood data explicitly asks for the entrance year for 
both their recent and prior college program. Only students who have attended at 
least two colleges list a prior college. We use the year a child began the earliest 
observed college endeavor as their beginning year. This means that if a child has 
both information on a prior college entrance year and a recent college entrance 
year, we treat the prior college entrance year as the child’s beginning year.  
 To determine a child’s beginning year of postsecondary education from the 
Main Family data, imputation is required. The Main Family data collects 
information on the year a Head or Spouse last attended college, the highest year 
of college completed (recorded as “completed one year,” “completed two years,” 
up to “completed five or more years”), and their highest degree type. There are 
two caveats to these data. The first caveat is that we are unable to include 
information from the Main Family data for individuals whose highest degree type 
is over a Bachelor’s because in that case the data available for the year that 
individual last attended college refers to a degree higher than a Bachelor’s (for 
which a parent could not have borrowed because parents are only eligible to 
borrow for a dependent child’s education and graduate students are considered 
independents).19 This means that for individuals with more than a Bachelor’s 
degree, we cannot observe a college entrance year, so we do not include them. 
The second caveat is that information is not collected about the child’s college 
entrance year. Because of this, we impute a child’s beginning college year as the 
year they last attended college minus the highest year of college completed.  
 Much of the rich data collected by the PSID is public but some individually 
identifiable information is restricted and available only by application. For this 
study, we use restricted PSID data that identifies a child’s undergraduate 
institution. The restricted PSID contains the IPEDS Unit ID for the child’s 
undergraduate institution within both the Transition to Adulthood and the Main 
Family data. In the Transition to Adulthood data, we match a parent-child pair to 
the college that the child’s college entrance year refers to (i.e., if a child’s college 
entrance year refers to a prior college rather than a recent one, we match the 
prior college’s IPEDS Unit ID to the parent-child pair). In the Main Family data, 
identifying information is collected on the college that the Head or Spouse (who 
here is a child of the parent we are interested in) received their highest degree 
from. (We only include parent-child pairs where the child’s highest degree is a 
Bachelor’s or less for reasons outlined in the above paragraph.) Unlike the 
Transition to Adulthood data, we lack information about college changes, so for 
the Main Family data we assume that the school a child’s Bachelor’s degree is 
from is also the school where a child began their degree. If both Transition to 
Adulthood and Main Family survey data on undergraduate institution is 
available, we use the data that has the earliest corresponding beginning year. 
                                                   
19 This represents about 25% of college-educated of Heads and Spouses in any PSID Main Family 
survey.  
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 We next detail our treatment of the dependent variables: individual 
retirement accounts, labor force status, and retirement expectations. The PSID 
collects information about household wealth, both with and without home equity, 
as calculated by the sum of seven asset types less the sum of eight debt types.  For 
this paper, we are specifically interested in a family’s Individual Retirement 
Accounts. Note the amount of dollars in IRAs are collected for the family as a 
whole rather than for individuals. 
 Labor force status is collected for all individuals. Individuals can be 
working now (employed), only temporarily laid off, looking for work 
(unemployed), retired, permanently disabled, keeping house, a student, or other.  
We only treat those who are looking for work as unemployed; we treat individuals 
who are retired, permanently disabled, keeping house, or a student as not in the 
labor force. 
 If a Head or Spouse has access to a pension or retirement plan at their 
current job, questions about retirement were asked in the Main Family survey. 
Respondents were asked at what age the Head or Spouse planned to stop 
working, with both a continuous response (actual expected age) and a binary 
response (“never”) accepted. Respondents were asked about the usual retirement 
age of others who performed their job or that they worked with. Using this 
information, we create a “retirement gap” variable representing the distance 
between the individual’s expected retirement age and the perceived retirement 
age of others. A positive retirement gap indicates the individual believes they will 
retire after the average retirement age of others; a negative retirement gap 
indicates the individual believes they will retire before the average retirement age 
of others.   
 Finally, the treatment of the coefficient of interest, student loans, follows. 
Within the Main Family survey, student loan debt information is collected for a 
family as a whole. For this study, our main interest is the effect of student loan 
presence in the household, thus distinguishing between loans taken out by 
parents and those taken out by students is not our focus and would be difficult to 
disentangle given the structure of the data available.  
 Summary statistics are listed below in Table 8. Statistics for dependent 
variables are listed first, followed by student loan information, and then data for 
other controls. 
 While the PSID collects information on many individuals, we end up with 
772 observations in our main analysis. This is a result of several factors: (1) of the 
27,709 parent-child pairs that the PSID identifies, only 7,640 parent-child pairs 
have links to children with restricted data available on the child’s undergraduate 
institution, (2) the sample drops from 7,640 parent-child pairs to 5,435 parents 
once we collapse data to the parent level (2) only 3,510 of these parent-child pairs 
have information available about student loan presence in the household, (3) 
only 2,988 of these parent-child pairs have a college that can be matched to 
information available from IPEDS, and (4) general loss of sample size once 
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Table 8. Summary Statistics for Main Analyses.  
 Mean Min Max 
Retire Gap 1.37 -32.00 40.00 
Usual Employment Status: 
Retirement Age (Others) 
62.31 20.00 97.00 
Expected Employment Status: 
Retirement Age (Self) 
65.04 50.00 90.00 
Never Expects to Retire 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Employment Status: Retired 0.12 0.00 1.00 
Employment Status: Not in the Labor 
Force 
0.18 0.00 1.00 
Employment Status: Unemployed 0.03 0.00 1.00 
Employment Status: Employed 0.81 0.00 1.00 
Tens of Thousands of Real 2015 
Dollars in IRA/Annuities 
11.35 0.00 356.05 
Whether Anyone in Family has 
IRA/Annuities 
0.32 0.00 1.00 
Whether Anyone in Family has 
Student Loans 
0.18 0.00 1.00 
Amount of Student Loans in Family in 
Tens of Thousands of 2015 Dollars 
0.51 0.00 25.00 
Age 57.41 38.00 81.00 
Social Security Eligibility 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Spouse Present 0.69 0.00 1.00 
Gender (Female = 1) 0.51 0.00 1.00 
Black 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Other Race 0.08 0.00 1.00 
Hispanic 0.12 0.00 1.00 
Health Status 2.56 1.00 5.00 
Real Assets in Tens of Thousands of 
2015 $s 
49.62 0.00 3573.50 
Household Income Less Own Labor 
Income in Tens of Thousands of 2015 
$s 
5.07 0.00 79.03 
Real Assets Less Dollars in 
IRA/Annuities in Tens of Thousands 
of 2015 $s 
38.26 0.00 3373.50 
Survey Reference Year: Employment 
Status 
2014.97 2011.00 2015.00 
First entrance year of a parent's 
latest entering child 
2004.69 1987.00 2013.00 
Number of Children Matched in 
College 
1.51 1.00 5.00 
Total Years of College for All Children 4.56 0.00 19.00 
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Table 8. Continued.  
 Mean Min Max 
Financial Literacy (Scale = 0-6) 4.76 0.00 6.00 
Earliest Wealth in Tens of Thousands 
of 2015 $s 
14.08 -18.36 2059.11 
Mother's Education: 0-5 Grades 0.01 0 1 
Mother's Education: 6-8 Grades 0.12 0 1 
Mother's Education: 9-11 Grades 0.14 0 1 
Mother's Education: High School 
Graduate 
0.46 0 1 
Mother's Education: High School 
Graduate + Some Nonacademic 
Training 
0.04 0 1 
Mother's Education: Some College or 
Associate’s Degree 
0.11 0 1 
Mother's Education: Bachelor’s 
Degree 
0.10 0 1 
Mother's Education: Advanced 
Degree 
0.03 0 1 
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controls are included because many individuals have missing information for at 
least one control. 
 
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System 
Data on institutions comes from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data 
System (IPEDS). IPEDS contains data on a wide variety of college information, 
including place, financing, and student makeup. For this study, we use data on a 
college’s institutional control (public, private, or for profit); if the college is a 
Historically Black College; and if the college is a two-year or four-year institution. 
We merge this information onto the PSID data using the IPEDS Unit ID. Any 
observation that cannot be matched with an institution through the IPEDS data 
is dropped. We use dummy variables to represent the percent of a parent’s 
children that have attended a certain type of college. For example, there are three 
categories for the percent of a parent’s children that have attended a privately 
owned college: “None,” “Some,” or “All.” Reducing the percentages to indicators 
is necessary because of the small sample size and nature of the restricted PSID 
data: no data with cell sizes smaller than 11 are allowed to be used in analyses. 
Institutional characteristics for colleges that parent’s children attended are 
shown below in Table 9.  
 
Results 
 
We present results both for the effect of the presence of student loan debt within 
the family and the amount of student loan debt in the family in tens of thousands 
of 2015 dollars. For the main results, we examine the effect of these student loan 
debt variables on retirement expectations, employment status, and IRAs. In 
addition, we address the possibility that families who borrow are significantly 
different from families who do not borrow in three ways: (1) we present two 
robustness checks with additional controls, one controlling for the earliest wealth 
a family has and one controlling for the parent’s financial literacy and the 
parent’s mother’s education, and (2) we look at the likelihood that current 
student loan debt burden can successfully predict which families had money 
problems in 1996, and (3) we report Oster’s δ statistic and bias-adjusted β to give 
an idea of how much selection is due to unobservables.  
 For the robustness checks with additional controls, we present the effect 
only on employment status because we lose further observations once we 
introduce these controls and employment status has the most reliably large 
sample size, however results for the other dependent variables follow the results 
of the main analysis. 
 Table 10 shows the effect of having student loans within a family on a 
parent’s retirement expectations. No retirement expectation variable is 
significantly affected by student loan presence. We do not find a significant effect 
on the likelihood a parent will never expect to retire, the age a parent expects to  
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Table 9. College Institution Characteristics for Parent Sample. 
  Frequency Percent 
No Children Attended Historical Black 
College or University 
769 93.78 
Some Children Attended Historical Black 
College or University 
17 2.07 
All Children Attended Historical Black 
College or University 
34 4.15 
No Children Attended Private Institution 611 74.51 
Some Children Attended Private Institution 76 9.27 
All Children Attended Private Institution 133 16.22 
No Children Attended For-Profit Institution  759 92.56 
Some Children Attended For-Profit 
Institution 
18 2.2 
All Children Attended For-Profit Institution  43 5.24 
No Children Attended Public Institution 179 21.83 
Some Children Attended Public Institution 88 10.73 
All Children Who Attended Public Institution 553 67.44 
No Children Attended 4-Year or Higher 
Institution 
255 31.1 
Some Children Attended 4-Year or Higher 
Institution 
70 8.54 
All Children Attended 4-Year or Higher 
Institution 
495 60.37 
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Table 10. The Effect of Any Student Loan Debt on Retirement Expectations. 
 Retirement 
Gap 
Others' 
Usual 
Retirement 
Age for 
Same Job 
Age 
Expected to 
Retire (Self) 
Never 
Expects to 
Retire 
Any Student Loans -0.433 1.13 0.888 0.024 
 (0.81) (0.78) (0.58) (0.04) 
Bias-Adjusted  β 
(δ=1) 
-0.44 1.57 1.389 0.03 
Bias-Adjusted β 
(δ=1) within 2.8 
Standard Errors of 
Controlled  β? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
δ (β = 0) 10.86 -3.48 -1.88 -5.22 
δ>1 ?  Yes No No No 
R2 0.27 0.31 0.37 0.18 
N 401 418 691 761 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
retire, or the “retirement gap” (the distance between when a parent predicts they 
will retire and when they believe others’ with their same job retire). In addition to 
being insignificant, the direction of the coefficients does not tell a consistent 
story: the coefficients for “never” expect to retire and retirement age are positive 
(implying loans cause parents to expect to work longer) but the coefficient for the 
retirement “gap” is negative (implying loans cause parents to retire earlier).  
 Turning to the employment status analysis shown in Table 11, results 
indicate student loan debt presence shifts workers into the labor force and 
particularly into employment, though both of these coefficients are significant 
only at the 10% level. The likelihood of a parent being retired is not significantly 
impacted by student loan debt presence. The likelihood of not being in the labor 
force for any reason (retirement, student status, housemaker, or disabled) falls by 
5.4 percentage points; and the likelihood of being employed increases 5.5 
percentage points. The magnitude of the effect of student loan debt presence is in 
line with effect of mortgage and credit card debt on retirement found by Butrica 
& Karamcheva (2013). They found that the presence of credit card debt increased 
the likelihood an individual would be working by 4.3 percentage points and the 
presence of mortgage debt increased the likelihood an individual would be 
working by 7.4 percentage points.  
The 0.1 percentage point difference we find between the likelihood of being in the 
labor force and being employed suggests the possibility that some of the 
increased likelihood of employment may be due to a reduction in unemployment 
as well, but the unemployment results do not display a significant  
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Table 11. The Effect of Any Student Loan Debt on Employment Status. 
 Retired 
Not in Labor 
Force 
Unemployed Employed 
Any Student Loans -0.035 -0.054* -0.016 0.055* 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Bias-Adjusted β (δ=1) 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 
Bias-Adjusted β (δ=1) 
within 2.8 Standard 
Errors of Controlled  
β? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
δ (β = 0) 1.20 1.84 49.06 1.87 
δ>1 ?  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.37 0.3 0.14 0.3 
N 771 771 771 771 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
effect and the R2 for unemployment is notably lower than the R2 for the other 
employment status regressions. The degree of selection on observables for these 
regressions all exceed the δ = 1.0 threshold, and the bias-adjusted treatment 
coefficients are all within 2.8 standard errors of the treatment coefficient of the 
original analyses. 
 Looking at the retirement savings results presented in Table 12, we do not 
find an impact of the likelihood of having an IRA or annuities within the family, 
but we find a very large effect on the amount of real 2015 dollars in an IRA or 
annuity. Results imply that the presence of any student loans within a family 
decreases the dollars in an IRA by a little more than $70,000 on average. The 
average per borrower amount of parental PLUS loan in the 2016-2017 school-
year was $15,878 (CollegeBoard, 2018), or approximately one-fourth of the 
decrease in the IRA. If a parent took out this amount over a child’s four-year 
college career, the amount of PLUS loan needing to be serviced would be smaller 
than the dollars in IRA reduction estimated ($63,512 vs. $70,040). This result 
also passes Oster’s standards for robustness.  
 Tables 13, 14, and 15 show the effect of the amount of student loan debt on 
retirement expectations, employment status, and retirement savings, 
respectively. We lose several observations that reported the student debt in a 
household as a range (for example, less than $10,000 but more than $5,000) 
rather than a number. The pattern of results differs from those found when 
examining the presence of student loan debt. The results indicate an additional 
$10,000 in student loan debt in a household increases the age a parent expects to 
retire at by a little less than five months; note that this is only 7.7% of a standard 
deviation of expected retirement age.20 Note however that the associated δ 
                                                   
20 The standard deviation for retirement age in the sample is 4.89 years (4 years and 11 months).  
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Table 12. The Effect of Any Student Loan debt on Retirement Savings. 
  
Dollars in IRA/Annuities 
(Tens of Thousands of 
2015 $s) 
Whether Anyone in 
Family has 
IRA/Annuities 
Any Student Loans -7.004** -0.074 
 (3.03) (0.06) 
Bias-Adjusted β (δ=1) -6.33 -0.05 
Bias-Adjusted β (δ=1) 
within 2.8 Standard 
Errors of Controlled  β? 
Yes Yes 
δ (β = 0) 7.21 2.57 
δ>1 ?  Yes Yes 
R2 0.37 0.35 
N 767 767 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 13. The Effect of Amount of Student Loan Debt (In Tens of Thousands of 
2015 $s) on Retirement Expectations. 
 Retirement 
Gap 
Others' Usual 
Retirement Age 
for Same Job 
Age 
Expected to 
Retire (Self) 
Never 
Expects to 
Retire 
Student Loans 
(2015 $s, Tens of 
Thousands) 
-0.041 0.159 0.376** 0.001 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.16) (0.01) 
Bias-Adjusted β 
(δ=1) 
-0.019 0.199 0.456 0.002 
Bias-Adjusted β 
(δ=1) within 2.8 
Standard Errors 
of Controlled  β? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
δ (β = 0) 1.717 -6.923 -5.594 -1.166 
δ>1 ?  Yes No No No 
R2 0.27 0.31 0.39 0.19 
N 400 417 687 756 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 14. The Effect of Amount of Student Loan Debt (in Tens of Thousands of 
2015 $s) on Employment Status. 
  Retired 
Not in Labor 
Force 
Unemployed Employed 
Student Loans 
(2015 $s, Tens of 
Thousands) 
-0.004 -0.005 -0.001 0.005 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Bias-Adjusted β 
(δ=1) 
0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
Bias-Adjusted β 
(δ=1) within 2.8 
Standard Errors 
of Controlled  β? 
No No Yes No 
δ (β = 0) 0.856 1.012 3.493 1.717 
δ>1 ?  No Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.37 0.3 0.14 0.3 
N 763 763 763 763 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 15. The Effect of Amount of Student Loan Debt (in Tens of Thousands of 
2015 $s) on Retirement Savings. 
 
Dollars in 
IRA/Annuities (Tens 
of Thousands of 2015 
$s) 
Whether Anyone in 
Family has 
IRA/Annuities 
Student Loans (2015 $s, Tens 
of Thousands) 
-1.411** -0.013 
 (0.59) (0.01) 
Bias-Adjusted β (δ=1) -1.506 -0.013 
Bias-Adjusted β (δ=1) within 
2.8 Standard Errors of 
Controlled  β? 
Yes Yes 
δ (β = 0) -58.934 9.762 
δ>1 ?  No Yes 
R2 0.37 0.35 
N 759 759 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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coefficient is less than zero, so the robustness of the result is unclear. An 
additional $10,000 does not decrease the likelihood of being retired or out of the 
labor force in general, nor does it increase the likelihood of employment, unlike 
the results in the analyses that looked at student loan debt presence. Having ten 
thousand dollars in student loan debt lowers a household’s retirement savings by 
$14,110, or a little less than half of a standard deviation in retirement savings.21 It 
is possible this is indicative of selection bias, here too δ < 0, or that there are 
compounding effects of reducing IRA contributions, such as losing employer 
matching or interest from the account. However, if a parent owed $10,000 on a 
PLUS loan with an interest rate of 7.0%22, the total amount a parent would pay 
over the entire repayment period of 10 years under the most expensive 
repayment plan is $15,025.23  
 For these base regressions, we report all coefficients outside of fixed 
effects in Appendix C in Tables 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, and 38. We next turn to the 
robustness checks.  
 
Robustness Checks: Additional Controls 
In the next part of the exploration of the effect of student loan debt, we present 
the coefficients of interest when a household’s earliest level of wealth is included 
 (shown in Tables 16 and 17) and coefficients of interest when a parent’s financial 
literacy (on a scale from 0 to 6, 6 being the highest) and a parent’s mother’s 
education is included (shown in Tables 18 and 19). Financial literacy is measured 
by the number of questions concerning financial literacy an individual answered 
correctly on a supplemental survey in 2016. Maternal education is included in a 
categorical variable that ranges from 1 (elementary education) to 6 (advanced 
degree). We only examine employment status because the inclusion of the 
additional controls results in the loss of around a hundred observations and 
employment status is the dependent variable with the most observations. 
 Interestingly, in the robustness check with earliest wealth included, the 
additional control results in larger coefficient estimates in absolute value and no 
loss in significance. However, the estimate when parent’s financial literacy and  
mother’s education are included is insignificant and the δ falls below one, 
suggesting selection into borrower status may be driven by unobservables, 
perhaps unobservable individual characteristics best proxied for by maternal 
education and financial literacy. 
 
Robustness Checks: Student Loan Debt and Money Problems 
The key issue within this analysis remains the possibility of selection bias, which 
the robustness checks suggest may be problematic. One such possibility is that 
people with different levels of financial literacy or concern over financial 
problems may select into borrower status at different rates. One way that we 
addressed this issue is by including a measure of financial literacy in the  
                                                   
21 The standard deviation for IRA dollars is $33,180. 
22 An interest rate of 7.0% is the PLUS loan interest rate for the 2017-2018 school year.  
23 Calculations using Federal Student Aid’s Repayment Estimator (Federal Student Aid, 2018).   
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Table 16. The Effect of Any Student Loan Debt on Employment Status, 
Controlling for Earliest Wealth Available.  
  Retired Not in Labor Force Unemployed Employed 
Any Student 
Loans 
-0.034 -0.063* -0.019 0.063* 
 (0.024) (0.034) (0.014) (0.034) 
Bias-Adjusted 
β (δ=1) 
-0.006 -0.033 -0.017 0.033 
Bias-Adjusted 
β (δ=1) 
within 2.8 
Standard 
Errors of 
Controlled  β? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
δ (β = 0) 1.194 1.978 5.735 1.979 
δ>1 ?  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.37 0.34 0.18 0.34 
N 596 596 596 596 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 17. The Effect of Amount of Student Loan Debt on Employment Status, 
Controlling for Earliest Wealth Available.  
  Retired Not in Labor Force Unemployed Employed 
Student 
Loans (2015 
$s, Tens of 
Thousands) 
0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
Bias-Adjusted 
β (δ=1) 
0.004 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 
Bias-Adjusted 
β (δ=1) 
within 2.8 
Standard 
Errors of 
Controlled  β? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
δ (β = 0) 0.034 0.393 2.572 0.392 
δ>1 ?  No No Yes No 
R2 0.37 0.35 0.18 0.35 
N 590 590 590 590 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 18. The Effect of Any Student Loan Debt on Employment Status, 
Controlling for Parent’s Financial Literacy and Parent’s Mother’s Education.  
Retired Not in Labor Force Unemployed Employed 
Any Student 
Loans 
-0.023 -0.052 -0.020 0.052 
 (0.031) (0.041) (0.019) (0.041) 
Bias-Adjusted 
β (δ=1) 
0.024 0.000 -0.018 0.000 
Bias-Adjusted 
β (δ=1) within 
2.8 Standard 
Errors of 
Controlled  β? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
δ (β = 0) 0.510 0.997 5.926 1.000 
δ>1 ?  No No Yes No 
R2 0.45 0.36 0.24 0.36 
N 461 461 461 461 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 19. The Effect of Amount of Student Loan Debt on Employment Status, 
Controlling for Parent’s Financial Literacy and Parent’s Mother’s Education. 
  Retired Not in Labor Force Unemployed Employed 
Student Loans 
(2015 $s, Tens 
of Thousands) 
0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
Bias-Adjusted β 
(δ=1) 
0.009 0.011 0.001 -0.011 
Bias-Adjusted β 
(δ=1) within 2.8 
Standard 
Errors of 
Controlled  β? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
δ (β = 0) -0.377 -0.256 0.304 -0.255 
δ>1 ?  No No No No 
R2 0.45 0.37 0.24 0.37 
N 455 455 455 455 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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robustness check above. Below, we also address it by seeing if student loan debt 
in the current period is a significant predictor of financial problems in the past.  
 The measure of financial problems used here is from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics’s 1996 Main Family survey. Within the 1996 survey, the PSID 
asked several questions about levels of financial distress within a family. From 
this financial distress data, we create an indicator for if an individual is a member 
of a family in 1996 that experienced one or more of six types of financial distress: 
the family (1) was unable to pay bills, (2) obtained a loan to pay off debts, (3) had 
creditors call, (4) had wages garnished, (5) had a lien on property, or (6) had 
property repossessed. In Tables 20 and 21 we present the relationship between 
student loan debt and the presence of money problems in the past. To attempt to 
ameliorate the possibility that the presence of historical money problems could 
decrease a family’s ability to borrow student loans or increase the need to borrow, 
we only include observations where the latest child’s college entrance year is at 
least five years after 1996.24 
We find evidence that families with a history of financial problems are more 
likely to have student loan debt present in the household although we do not find 
an effect on the amount of student loan debt within the household. Taken with 
the robustness checks presented above, this indicates there may be systematic 
differences between parents in borrowing families and parents in non-borrowing 
families. In particular, we find evidence of a positive selection bias: families that 
have had money problems in the past are more likely to take out student loans, 
and these families may then be more likely to work longer, save less, and expect 
to retire later. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper is a first attempt to identify the effect of student loans on parents’ 
outcomes, while also engaging in formal tests of robustness to determine if the 
results can be construed as causal. We examine the effect of student loan  
presence in the household on parents’ retirement behaviors, expectations, and  
savings. Results indicate the presence of loans in the household significantly 
impacts retirement decisions along a number of dimensions: loan presence  
increases the likelihood a parent is in the labor force and employed and decreases 
the dollars in a household’s IRA. An additional $10,000 in student loan debt 
amount increases expected retirement age by 5 months and decreases IRA dollars 
by $14,000. However, we find evidence a household’s loan status is driven by 
previous financial hardship status. Further, a technique developed by Oster raises 
the possibility that results may be driven by a selection issue. 
 Given that our results indicate significant effects of student loans on 
parents on a number of margins, but that we cannot establish causality with 
certainty, it is an area ripe for more research. More research, however, calls for 
more and better data. While parent PLUS loans are included in the Title IV 
                                                   
24 The credit check used for PLUS loans includes a five-year lookback for adverse credit history. 
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Table 20. Presence of Any Student Loan Debt as a Predictor for Historical Money 
Problems. 
 Any 1996 Money Problems 
Any Student Loans 0.114* 
 (0.062) 
R2 0.23 
N 635 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 21. Amount of Student Loan Debt as a Predictor for Historical Money 
Problems. 
 Any 1996 Money Problems 
Student Loans (2015 $s, Tens of 
Thousands) 
0.011 
 (0.011) 
R2 0.22 
N 628 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Volume Reports25, they are not included in College’s ScoreCards, unlike loans 
taken out by students. Further, surveys frequently used to examine the effect of 
post-secondary funding on later outcomes (like Baccalaureate & Beyond) solely 
examine students. We hope that this first effort will lead to greater attention and 
study focused on the parental PLUS loan program, both by policymakers and by 
researchers.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
25 Found at https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/student/title-iv.  
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CHAPTER 3  
MERIT AID & FAMILY DEBT IN LOTTERY SCHOLARSHIP 
STATES 
 
Introduction 
 
During the past few decades, two consistent trends in college financing have 
arisen. The first trend is that student loans now make up a much larger portion of 
the average student’s college financing portfolio: from 1993 to 2014 there was a 
40% increase in the number of college graduates who had borrowed student 
loans to fund their education. During the same time period, many states rolled 
out large scale merit-based scholarships. The interaction of these concurrent 
changes is the subject of this paper: I examine the effect of lottery scholarship 
eligibility on a broad measure of debt within a family, which includes student 
loans and credit card bills as well as other debt, using a simple difference-in-
difference analysis.  
 Georgia introduced the first lottery-based merit aid scholarship in 1993 
(Tennessee Higher Education Commission, 2016). Since the introduction of 
Georgia’s HOPE scholarship, eight states have rolled out lottery-based merit aid 
scholarships. These lottery scholarships are differentiated from other merit aid 
scholarships not only by their funding source (a state lottery) but also because of 
their relatively generous aid packages. Sjoquist & Winter (2014) categorize all 
states with lottery scholarships as “strong merit aid states,” taking both the level 
of scholarship aid and the percent of students who qualify into account.26 I list 
these states, and the date that the state began disbursing lottery scholarships, in 
Table 22.  
 Lottery scholarships have a few clear purposes. The Tennessee Hope 
Scholarship program’s purpose is explicitly “to provide access for Tennesseans to 
post-secondary education, to improve high school and collegiate academic 
achievement, to keep more of the best and brightest students in Tennessee, and 
to provide social and economic benefits to the state of Tennessee” (Tennessee 
Higher Education Commission, 2016). There is a large literature on the first-
order impact of lottery scholarships. However, the impact of merit aid 
scholarships in general on debt uptake and amount is relatively understudied and 
the subject of only one published paper and two working papers thus far. During 
this time of rapidly increasing college tuitions, falling levels of state and federal 
funding for higher education, and rising student loan debt, the impact of merit-
based financial aid on debt is worthy of attention.  
 Previous literature on student loan debt has found that student loans 
impact borrowers’ decisions more than would be predicted by economic models 
since student loans (even those in tens of thousands of dollars) represent a small  
                                                   
26 Of the “strong merit aid states” that Sjoquist & Winter (2014) identify, only Nevada does not 
have a lottery scholarship.  
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Table 22. Lottery Scholarship States Included in the Analyses & The Scholarship’s 
Implementation Year.27  
State 
Lottery Scholarship Implementation 
Year 
Georgia 1993 
Florida 1997 
New Mexico 1997 
South Carolina 1998 
Louisiana 1998 
Kentucky 1999 
West Virginia 2002 
Tennessee 2004 
  
 
amount of the typical college-going person’s lifetime income. Nevertheless, the 
literature has found that student loans impact career choices, decrease overall 
levels of wealth, and decrease the likelihood that an individual will be married 
(Rothstein & Rouse, 2011; Field, 2009; Cooper & Wang, 2014; Gicheva, 2016). In 
addition, descriptive analyses have found that student loan borrowers have 
higher levels of credit card debt than non-borrowers and higher debt-to-
household-income (Fry, 2014).  
 Does merit aid lead to lower debt levels for young adults? I seek to answer 
this question and add to the research in this area using a difference-in-difference 
analysis to examine the effect of lottery scholarships on a broad measure of debt 
that includes not only student loan debt but also credit card debt, medical bills, 
legal bills, and loans from relatives. I define treated individuals as those who were 
enrolled in a cohort in college during which a lottery scholarship was available in 
their state of residence. I use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID), a panel that has been running since 1968 and specifically collected 
information on a broad measure of debt (credit card charges, student loans, 
medical and legal bills, and loans from relatives) in 1984, 1989, 1994, and 1999 to 
2015. The longer time frame of this panel allows me to use a difference-in-
difference methodology that takes advantage of variation in the rollout of these 
programs both across time and across states. The methodology and dataset 
enable me to examine multiple cohorts and the effect of these scholarships on all 
treated individuals who attended college, not only those who graduated, and the 
effect of these scholarships on a broad debt measure.  
 The results of the analyses suggest that merit aid scholarships do not lower 
debt levels or the likelihood of debt uptake. These insights add to a literature that 
has found divergent results through the use of a broader debt measure and an 
analysis that examines a longer timeframe, both college graduates and non-
graduates, and multiple states.    
 
                                                   
27 Source: Sjoquist & Winters (2014), Table 1. 
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Literature Review 
 
The other related papers on this topic have all approached this question in 
slightly different ways. Chen and Wiederspan (2014), the first paper to examine 
this question, utilize the Baccalaureate & Beyond 2000/2001 data survey of 1999 
– 2000 graduates. During this time, only Georgia (whose HOPE program was the 
first strong merit aid program, as defined by Sjoquist and Winters (2014)) would 
have treated graduates to be surveyed. Chen and Wiederspen examine the impact 
of merit aid (in general rather than only large-scale merit aid) on student 
borrowing. They find that when Georgia is included in the analysis, merit aid 
significantly lowers student borrowing; however, when Georgia is excluded, this 
significance disappears. They dub this “the Georgia Effect”: “This finding may 
imply that the relationship between state non-need (merit) aid and graduates’ 
debt burden in Georgia was so strong that it drove the results for all state related 
covariates” (Chen & Wiederspan, 2014, pg. 585). Why would this be the case? The 
authors found that Georgia’s merit aid level was several times larger in 
magnitude than the average state’s; they propose such a large level of merit aid 
decreases student loan uptake. 
 A working paper by Chapman (2015) also utilizes a later Baccalaureate & 
Beyond survey of the 2008 – 2009 graduating cohort, so the examined cohort 
contains a larger number of students who would have been exposed to a large-
scale scholarship and these students have greater geographic variation than in 
Chen & Wiederspan (2014).  Chapman uses differing ACT score eligibility 
thresholds for both a difference-in-difference analysis and a regression 
discontinuity analysis. Because she uses the ACT score eligibility threshold, she 
restricts the merit aid states she examines to those that use the ACT (or 
comparable SAT) as a criterion of eligibility. In the difference-in-difference 
analysis, she exploits variation over state and over ACT score (i.e., a graduate is 
“treated” if their ACT score is at or above the ACT cutoff and their state has a 
merit aid scholarship). She finds a consistent negative effect of merit aid 
eligibility on student loan amount; merit aid significantly reduces the amount of 
student loan debt the average student will borrow in both analysis types. In the 
regression discontinuity analysis, aid eligibility reduces total loan amount by 
between $7200 and $7600; in the difference-in-difference analysis, aid eligibility 
reduces total loan amount by between $5800 and $6400. She finds evidence for 
a reduction in the likelihood of loan uptake of around 8 percentage points with 
the difference-in-difference analysis but no significant effect with the regression 
discontinuity approach.  
 Because both Chapman (2015) and Chen & Weiderspan (2016) use the 
Baccalaureate & Beyond data, they are only able to examine college graduates. 
Scott-Clayton and Zafar (2016) use a unique data set from West Virginia that 
links students’ academic information with later-in-life credit information. 
Interestingly, they find greater effects of student loans on the intensive margin 
rather than the extensive margin, in contrast to Chapman (2015).  Like Chapman 
(2015), they use graduates’ ACT scores as the discontinuity in a regression 
 50 
 
discontinuity analysis and a difference-in-difference analysis with ACT score as 
one source of treatment variation but the other source they exploit is college 
entrance year rather than state (i.e. they view a student as “treated” with West 
Virginia’s PROMISE scholarship if the student met the eligibility threshold and 
began college in a year when the PROMISE was available). Within the regression 
discontinuity results, Scott-Clayton and Zafar find that the West Virginia 
PROMISE does decrease the likelihood of student loan debt uptake (by around 7 
percentage points). However, they do not find an effect on the average dollar 
amount of student loan debt that a graduate has because there are countervailing 
effects: likely PROMISE recipients borrow significantly fewer loans at the 
undergraduate level but are significantly more likely to attend graduate school 
and borrow more loans at the graduate level than unlikely PROMISE recipients. 
The difference-in-difference analysis indicates lower likelihood of student loan 
uptake but not with the consistency of the regression discontinuity, suggesting 
the local average treatment effect and the average treatment effect may be 
dissimilar. In addition, Scott-Clayton and Zafar (2016) also measure the effect of 
merit aid scholarships on credit card balances. They do not find any significant 
effect. 
 
Model  
 
The difference-in-difference approach I propose uses both geographic variation 
and time variation. My estimating equation is as follows 
Yi=α+β(MeritStates*Aftert)+θ(StateFEs)+ϑ(EntranceYearFEt)+Xiφ+ui 
In this estimation, 𝑌𝑖 is a broad debt measure within the household that 
individual i physically resides in during the most recent survey after the student 
has stopped attending college. This debt measure includes student loans, credit 
card bills, medical bills, legal bills, and loans from relatives. I control for state 
and cohort fixed effects and consider individuals as “treated” with eligibility for a 
merit aid scholarship if they entered college in a state-year where a lottery 
scholarship would be available. Xi is a vector of student characteristics, including 
demographics (age when debt surveyed, gender, and race), the distance between 
the person’s college exit year and year their debt was surveyed, the total years of 
college education for all individuals within the household, and the individual’s 
father’s education level.28 All analyses use robust standard errors and person-
level weights. 
 The key threat to identification in any difference-in-difference analysis is 
the validity of the control group. If the control group and the treated group do not 
have parallel trends in counterfactual outcomes once observables are accounted 
for, then any estimated impacted of treatment may not be the result of a policy 
change but of differing paths altogether. In this study, a plausible threat to 
                                                   
28 Unfortunately, the Main Family PSID does not contain information on student’s high school 
performance or SAT or ACT score to control for a student’s academic characteristics prior to 
college. I include parental education as a proxy for the importance of education within the family. 
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identification would be if an underlying trend in student financing was occurring 
in states that introduced lottery scholarships that was not occurring in states that 
did not introduce them. I examine the results visually and econometrically with 
an event study design. I do not find any evidence of different pre-existing trends 
– instead, both pre- and post-treatment years display significant amounts of 
noise for either amount of debt or debt presence.  
 An additional worry with this particular analysis is that states’ lottery 
scholarships may have changed the student makeup within the state. Perhaps 
large scale scholarships lessen “brain drain” (the phenomenon of higher ability 
students attending out-of-state schools) or encourage students to enroll in college 
who otherwise would not have attended. I do not address either of these 
possibilities directly in my analyses, but previous literature in general indicates 
that large scale scholarships do not affect most students’ choice to attend college 
although it may change their sector choice (Bruce & Carruthers, 2014; Goodman, 
2008). The literature does suggest that effects are more pronounced for low 
income students and thus need-based aid programs may have greater impact on 
college choice than merit-based: Kane (2003) finds a significant effect on 
enrollment decisions when examining the effect of a California scholarship 
program based on both merit and need.  
 
Data 
 
The data I use to explore the effect of large-scale merit aid on a broad measure of 
debt is the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is a nationally 
representative survey that has followed families since 1968; currently the PSID is 
given every other year to participating families. PSID families answer both 
Individual and Main Family surveys each year.   
 The PSID is suited for the purposes of this study because the survey 
contains information both about a family’s state of residence each year and debt 
presence and amount (student loan debt grouped with a small set of other debt 
types in 1984, 1989, 1994, and 1999 to 2009, and separated subcategories for 
2011 to 2015). Below I detail how I treat these debt variables.  
 The PSID collects information both about the presence of debt (“…do you 
(or anyone in your family living there) currently have any other debts…?”) and 
about the amount of debt (“If you added up all of these debts (for all of your 
family living there), about how much would they amount to right now?”). The 
“other debt” measure the PSID used prior to 2011 explicitly asked about student 
loan debt, credit card debt, medical bills, legal bills, and loans from relatives 
combined, but as is shown below, within my sample student loan debt is the 
largest average debt amount and it and credit card debt are the most prevalent. 
This data comes with two important caveats: (1) the Main Family survey asks the 
amount of any debt for all members of a household rather than individually (i.e., 
“If you added up all student loans for all of your family living there, about how 
much would they amount to right now?”), and (2) the Main Family survey data 
only collects information about college exit year, years of college completed, and 
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year of high school graduation, not college entrance year. This is problematic 
because merit aid eligibility rests on assumptions about college entrance year 
(merit aid programs are implemented in a specific year, and individuals are 
assumed eligible based on when they enter college). I impute college entrance 
year using earliest college exit minus the years of college completed in the same 
survey year. This proxy for college entrance will be accurate if an individual does 
not take breaks during her college career. To bolster this analysis, I also use an 
alternative proxy for college entrance year, high school graduation year. High 
school graduation year may be a more accurate proxy for college entrance, but 
the PSID has only collected data on high school graduation in 2015, so the sample 
size is significantly smaller.  
 Both the advantage and disadvantage of using the broad debt measure 
data is the ability to examine the effect of large-scale merit aid not on student 
loan debt in particular but on the effect of large-scale merit aid on a more general 
measure of debt that includes credit card debt. However, this broad debt measure 
does not allow me to examine any dynamics that exist between types of debt. For 
example, if individuals treated with merit aid are less likely to take out student 
loans but more likely to take out credit card debt (or vice versa), the following 
analyses will be unable to pick up on those effects. 
 However, using this debt measure allows the creation of an analysis that 
goes back much further in time than using a student loan specific measure: the 
question about other debt was asked in 1984, 1989, 1994, and then every survey 
from 1999 through 2009. For 2011, 2013, and 2015, I construct a proxy variable 
for this larger debt variable using the separate measures for the five debt types. I 
assign the debt to a person for the most recent year after their college exit where I 
observe their debt level. Individuals in the 99th percentile of indebtedness are 
dropped so that outliers do not drive results. All variables in dollars have been 
transformed into constant 2015 dollars.  
 Within the Main Family data, debt is surveyed at the level of the household 
rather than individual, so I allow fractional measures of merit aid treatment. 
Families in the analysis for whom I can readily assign as having been exposed to a 
large-scale merit aid program or not in the family’s entirety are simply coded 0 
(not treated) or 1 (treated). I allow fractional treatment if members of a family 
have differing exposure (i.e., if a Head was not treated with aid eligibility but his 
Spouse was).   
 I present the summary statistics for the data in Table 23. About 11.5% of 
the sample was treated and began college in a year when a merit aid scholarship 
was available. Most of the sample has some form of other debt, and the average 
amount of debt, including those with no debt at all, is just over $15,100. The 
average person in the sample began college in about 1998, which indicates that 
there is a fair amount of variation within state because in 1998 five of the eight  
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Table 23. Summary Statistics for Sample. 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Count Min Max 
Any Other Debt .7227666 .4477618 1735 0 1 
Amount Real Other 
Debt (2015 ) 
15118.99 20827.35 1735 0 112477 
Scholarship Possible .1146974 .3001107 1735 0 1 
Earliest College 
Beginning 
1997.918 7.433334 1735 1985 2013 
College State (FIPS) 24.01787 13.55582 1735 1 51 
Distance between 
College Exit and 
Survey 
2.208646 1.11156 1735 1 5 
Age 23.49625 5.3859 1735 17 65 
Female .6069164 .488576 1735 0 1 
Years in College 
(Household) 
3.718732 2.244401 1735 1 10 
Father’s Education: 
No High School 
Diploma 
.1348703 .3416835 1735 0 1 
Father’s Education: 
High School 
Graduate, no 
Bachelor’s Degree 
.5394813 .4985825 1735 0 1 
Father’s Education: 
Bachelor’s Degree 
Recipient or Higher 
.3256484 .4687517 1735 0 1 
Race: White .6789625 .4670098 1735 0 1 
Race: Black .2945245 .4559601 1735 0 1 
Race: Other Race .026513 .1607013 1735 0 1 
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large scale merit aid scholarships would have launched. The sample skews more 
female, but this is reflective of the fact more women attend college than men.29 
 The final analyses end up with a sample size of 1,735. Of the 77,000 
individuals within the PSID, only 3,000 have information on debt, college 
enrollment, and college state. Only a little over half of this number have non-
missing information for the rest of the variables included. 
 Information about subcategories of debt is available in 2011, 2013, and 
2015. In Figure 3, I present a breakdown of the percent of individuals that have 
each of the five subcategories of debt that make up the broad measure of debt. In 
Figure 4, I present a breakdown of the average amount of debt for those five 
subcategories for all individuals. 
 Note that within this sample, student loan debt is both the most likely 
subcategory of debt to be present and the subcategory of debt with the largest 
average amount. Credit card debt is a close second to student loan debt in terms 
of presence, but the average credit card debt never exceeds $5,000 in any of the 
years subcategory information is available for and the average amount of student 
loan debt never falls below $15,000. Two of the other debt types, legal bills and 
loans from relatives, have such a low average amount they are difficult to identify 
in the graphs.  
 
Results 
 
I analyze the effect of large scale lottery scholarships using a difference-in-
difference analysis on the presence and amount of a broad measure of debt that 
includes credit card bills, student loan debt, medical bills, legal bills, and loans 
from relatives.  Table 24 shows the effect of enrolling in college in a state-year 
where a lottery scholarship was available; in Table 24 I use an estimate of college 
entrance year where entrance year is assumed to be the last year a person 
attended college less the years of college completed. 
 None of the coefficients of interest are statistically significant. The results 
do not indicate that lottery scholarship availability when an individual begins 
college effects the likelihood the individual’s family will experience an increase or 
decrease in the presence of debt, debt amount, or logged debt (which would 
capture a percent change in debt). These insignificant coefficients are negative, in 
line with the significant findings within the previous literature. The magnitudes 
of these estimates would indicate that families with individuals with scholarship 
eligibility are slightly less likely to have debt (0.6 percentage points less likely), 
on average have about $1,801 less in debt, and a 17.4% decrease in the amount of 
debt, all else equal. The magnitude of the amount of debt result are similar to the 
                                                   
29 See https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=72 for a breakdown of degree recipients both 
by race and by gender. 
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Figure 3. Any Debt for Individuals in Sample, Broken Down by Subcategories and 
Years.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Average Amount of Debt for Individuals in Sample, by Subcategories 
and Years.  
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Table 24. Effect of Lottery Scholarship Availability on Debt; College Exit Year 
Less Years College Completed Used as College Entrance Year. 
 Any Other 
Debt 
Amount Real 
Other Debt 
(2015) 
Log of Amount Real Other 
Debt (2015)  (=0 if Amount 
of Real Other Debt =0) 
Scholarship 
Available 
-0.00666 -1,801 -0.174 
 (0.0737) (3,447) (0.696) 
R2 0.114 0.170 0.097 
N 1,735 1,735 1,735 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
regression discontinuity estimate found by Scott-Clayton and Zafar (2016), who 
find that West Virginia PROMISE scholarship recipients had $1,400 less 
undergraduate debt on average, but the magnitude is about five times smaller 
than those found by Chapman (2015). Additionally, effect size of merit aid on 
debt presence is much smaller than that found by Chapman (2015) or Scott-
Clayton and Zafar (2016), both of which found effect sizes of around 8 percentage 
points.  
 One caveat to this result is that this analysis uses an imputed college 
entrance year. Because college entrance year determines if a person is treated 
with scholarship eligibility, college entrance year is central to the analysis. Below, 
I present another set of regressions in Table 25 where the individual’s college 
entrance year is treated as the year she graduated high school. The pairing of the 
two analyses is also informative because the use of an imputed college entrance 
year is likely to create some false positives (individuals who entered college in 
lottery scholarship states and took a break during college that the researcher 
cannot observe actually entered college prior to the implementation of the lottery 
scholarship, would incorrectly be designated as “lottery scholarship eligible”), 
whereas the use of the high school graduation year as the college entrance year is 
likely to create false negatives (individuals who delayed college entrance in lottery 
scholarship states and graduated high school prior to the lottery scholarship 
program but did not enter college until after the implementation of the 
scholarship, would be incorrectly designated “lottery scholarship ineligible”).  
 Although a few hundred observations are lost due to this scholarship 
eligibility question (“When did you graduate high school?”) only being asked in 
the 2015 survey, this second analysis supports the results of the first. The 
presence of the broad debt measure, the amount of debt in levels, and amount of 
debt in logs are not significantly affected by large scale merit aid scholarship 
eligibility, even with the alternative college entrance year measure, although the 
magnitudes are uniformly larger. Results with all coefficients except state and 
year fixed effects for both analyses can be found in Appendix D in Tables 39 and 
40.  
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Table 25. Effect of Lottery Scholarship Availability on Debt; High School 
Graduation Year Used as College Entrance Year. 
 Any Other 
Debt 
Amount Real 
Other Debt (2015) 
Log of Amount Real Other Debt 
(2015)  (=0 if Amount of Real 
Other Debt =0) 
Scholarship 
Available 
-0.0811 -4,920 -0.795 
 (0.0992) (4,474) (0.994)     
R2 0.140 0.198 0.127 
N 1,325 1,325 1,325 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 The magnitude of the effect of scholarship eligibility on debt presence is in 
line with that found in previous literature (Chapman, 2015; Scott-Clayton & 
Zafar, 2016), and the effect of scholarship  
eligibility on debt amount is within the fairly large range within the previous 
literature. Chapman (2015) found a reduction in student loan debt amount 
between $7,500 and $6,000 when a student was likely to be treated with a merit 
aid scholarship; Scott-Clayton and Zafar (2016) found a reduction in 
undergraduate student loan debt of $1,400 but an increase in graduate student 
loan debt. 
 In addition to these analyses, I present graphs of event studies in Figure 5 
and Figure 6. I do this to examine the possibility there is some type of trend 
occurring around the implementation year – perhaps debt initially falls with the 
availability of lottery scholarship funds, but as institutions adjust to the influx of 
dollars, tuition rises and so does the level of student borrowing. In both event 
study figures, t = 0 signifies the implementation year of the lottery scholarship, 
and t = -1 (the year prior to the scholarship’s implementation) is the omitted year. 
Both event studies use imputed college entrance (college exit year less years in 
college) because of the larger sample size. 
 The event studies exhibit a significant amount of noise, both before and 
after the implementation of the lottery scholarship. In addition, the effect of the 
lottery scholarship is visually centered on zero and zero is always within the 95% 
confidence intervals for each t, regardless of if the graph is examining the 
presence of debt or the amount of debt.  
 In summary, I do not find any evidence that lottery scholarships lower the 
amount of debt or likelihood of debt uptake. I examine the relationship 
analytically, using two different measures of college entrance year, and visually 
and econometrically with an event study. I discuss why these results may diverge 
from those found in the previous literature in the conclusion. 
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Figure 5. Presence of Broad Debt Measure.  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Amount of Debt (2015 $’s). 
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Conclusion  
 
Previous literature has found some evidence of lower levels and uptake of student 
loan debt when individuals are treated with large amounts of merit aid. Chen and 
Wiederspan (2014) found a significant effect of merit aid on student loans only 
when Georgia, the only state with a large merit aid program in existence during 
the cohort that Chen and Wiederspan examined, was included. Scott-Clayton and 
Zafar (2016), meanwhile, find evidence within their regression discontinuity 
analysis of decreased student loan uptake and lower amounts borrowed at the 
undergraduate level, and increased student loan uptake and higher amounts 
borrowed at the graduate level.  
 It is possible that, because the analyses presented here cannot distinguish 
between undergraduate and graduate borrowing, the contrasting impact end up 
masking any true significant effect. It is also possible that the analyses presented 
here cannot distinguish between the different types of debt within the debt 
measure and thus any substitution from student loans to credit card debt or vice 
versa is masked. However, the finding that families where individuals are treated 
with merit aid do not have lower or higher levels of total debt remains important, 
suggesting that merit aid does not lead to lower debt levels on average.  
 The diverging results within this literature emphasize that there is still 
much to be learned about the way individuals shape their college financing 
portfolios. Both student loan debt and these large merit aid scholarships make up 
billions of dollars of higher education spending: in the 2016-2017 school-year, 
over $58 billion dollars in student loans were disbursed to undergraduate 
students, and South Carolina alone disbursed over $100 million in aid with its 
Hope scholarship program (College Board, 2018; South Carolina Commission on 
Higher Education, 2018). Both policymakers and the public would benefit from 
further research on the way that merit aid scholarships interact with other 
sources of funding, especially debt.  
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Appendix A 
 
Table 26. Base Results with Differing Incidence Measures – No States Dropped 
Regardless of Number of State-Weeks Available.  
Polio Incidence: Average Weekly Incidence In Twelve Month Period  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  
Polio Incidence Per 100,000 -0.019 -0.016 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
R2 0.14 0.33 0.34 
N 125,716 125,716 125,716 
Polio Incidence: Total Incidence In Twelve Month Period  
  (4)  (5)  (6)  
Polio Incidence Per 100,000 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) 0.00  0.00  
R2 0.14 0.33 0.34 
N 125,716 125,716 125,716 
Polio Incidence: Maximum Incidence In Twelve Month Period  
  (7)  (8) (9) 
Polio Incidence Per 100,000 0 0.001 0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
R2 0.14 0.33 0.34 
N 125,716 125,716 125,716 
Polio Incidence: Minimum Incidence In Twelve Month Period  
  (10)  (11)  (12)  
Polio Incidence Per 100,000 -0.17 -0.152 -0.071 
 (0.16) (0.14) (0.13) 
R2 0.14 0.33 0.34 
N 125,716 125,716 125,716 
State & Year Fixed Effects x x x 
Epidemiological Controls x x x 
Demographic Characteristics  x x 
Head of Household & Family Characteristics   x 
Median Years of School Control   x 
Family Characteristics     x 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 27. Main Results with Probabilistic Regressions.  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Polio Incidence Per 100,000 -0.058** -0.055*** -0.048** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Log Pseudolikelihood -5,435,076.45 -4,337,607.97 -4,270,197.76 
N 95,839 95,839 95,839 
State & Year Fixed Effects x x x 
Epidemiological Controls x x x 
Demographic Characteristics  x x 
Head of Household & Family 
Characteristics 
  x 
Median Years of School 
Control 
  x 
Family Characteristics     x 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 28. Base Results with Varying Thresholds for the Number of State-Week 
Observations Necessary to be Included in the Regression.  
Missing Weeks: 10 Weeks (19.2%) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  
Polio Incidence Per 100,000 -0.058** -0.051** -0.031 
 (0.024) (0.020) (0.020) 
R2 0.10 0.36 0.37 
N 53,303 53,303 53,303 
Missing Weeks: 18 Weeks (34.6%) 
  (4)  (5)  (6)  
Polio Incidence Per 100,000 -0.053* -0.056** -0.045* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
R2 0.15 0.36 0.37 
N 77,261 77,261 77,261 
Missing Weeks: 26 Weeks (50%) 
  (7)  (8) (9) 
Polio Incidence Per 100,000 -0.013 -0.01 -0.005 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
R2 0.14 0.33 0.34 
N 120,476 120,476 120,476 
Missing Weeks: 39 Weeks (75%) 
  (10)  (11)  (12)  
Polio Incidence Per 100,000 -0.019 -0.015 -0.009 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
R2 0.14 0.33 0.34 
N 125,027 125,027 125,027 
State & Year Fixed Effects x x x 
Epidemiological Controls x x x 
Demographic Characteristics  x x 
Head of Household & Family 
Characteristics 
  x 
Median Years of School Control   x 
Family Characteristics     x 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 70 
 
Table 29. Main Regression with All Coefficients Except State and Year Fixed 
Effects.  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Polio Incidence Per 100,000 -0.041 -0.041* -0.035 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Median Years of Schooling (State-Year) -0.021*** 0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Female 0.014*** 0.444*** 0.011*** 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
Age 0 0.025* 0.445*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) 
Black -0.002** -0.039 0.038*** 
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) 
Other Race  -0.015** -0.02 
  (0.01) (0.03) 
Occupational Score of Head  0.011*** 0.002*** 
  (0.00) 0.00  
Female Head  0 0.041*** 
  (0.00) (0.01) 
Head Employed in Agriculture  -0.001* -0.041*** 
  (0.00) (0.01) 
Both Parents Foreign   0.012 
   (0.01) 
Number of Siblings   -0.006*** 
   (0.00) 
Rural   -0.083*** 
   (0.01) 
Birth Rate in t (State-Year)   -0.014** 
   (0.01) 
Birth Rate in t-5 (State-Year)   0.011** 
   (0.00) 
Birth Rate in t-6 (State-Year)   -0.001 
   (0.00) 
Percent of Homes with Running Water 
(State-Year) 
  -0.002*** 
   (0.00) 
Mother Present in Household   0.013 
   (0.01) 
Father Present in Household   0.024*** 
   (0.01) 
R2 0.14 0.34 0.35 
N 95,839 95,839 95,839 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 30. No Epidemiological Controls.  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Polio Incidence Per 100,000 -0.078*** -0.070*** -0.081*** 
 (0.024) (0.021) (0.020) 
R2 0.14 0.34 0.35 
N 96,834 96,834 96,834 
State & Year Fixed Effects x X x 
Epidemiological Controls x X x 
Demographic Characteristics  X x 
Head of Household & Family 
Characteristics 
  x 
Median Years of School Control   x 
Family Characteristics     x 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 31. No State Fixed Effects.  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Polio Incidence Per 100,000 0.121 0.126 0.123 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.077) 
R2 0.09 0.29 0.31 
N 95,839 95,839 95,839 
State & Year Fixed Effects x x x 
Epidemiological Controls x x x 
Demographic Characteristics  x x 
Head of Household & Family 
Characteristics 
  x 
Median Years of School Control   x 
Family Characteristics     x 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix B 
 
Table 32. Variables’ Descriptions and Creation.  
Variable Description & Creation 
Any Money Problems 
in 1996 
 
=1 if individual member of a family in 1996 where they 
(1) were unable to pay bills, (2) obtained a loan to pay 
off debts, (3) creditors called, (4) wages garnished, (5) 
had a lien on property, or (6) property repossessed 
Whether Anyone in 
Family has Student 
Loans 
If a family has any student loans. From Main Family 
data. 
Amount of Student 
Loans in Family in 
Tens of Thousands of 
2015 Dollars 
Real family student loans in tens of thousands. 
Transformed from dollars to tens of thousands of 
dollars and in real 2015 dollars.  
First entrance year of 
a parent's latest 
entering child 
 
First entrance year of a parent’s last college-entering 
child’s college entrance. Uses both Transition to 
Adulthood (TA) data + Main Family (MF) data. TA - 
college enrollment year, uses Enrollment Year Recent 
College unless Enrollment Year Prior College is both 
(a) available and (b) before Enrollment Year Recent 
College.  MF - imputed variable for Heads & Spouses; 
created by subtracting Highest Year In College from 
Year Last Attended College.  If both TA and MF data 
exist for an individual, the earlier year of the two is 
used; if earliest year the same for both, MF data is 
used. For final analysis, we use the LAST entrance year 
a parent is exposed to as our reference point (ie, if a 
parent's latest college entrance of a child is  2013, the 
entrance year included in the analysis is 2013). 
Earliest Wealth 
Wealth with equity from the earliest data available for 
a parent. In order for it to be pulled, (a) the year with 
earliest data availble has to be at least 10 years before 
the last child's earliest college entrance year, and (b) 
the parent has to be under 40 for the earliest year of 
data available. From Main Family File.   
Gender (Female = 1) 
 
If this is a mother (ie, female). Parent/Child pairs 
created using Individual Survey's "1968 ID of Mother" 
(or Father) and "Person # of Mother" (or Father). If 
parent-child pair matched on ID of mother, assume 
individual female/mother. If parent-chld pair matched 
on ID of father, assume individual male/father.  
Usual Employment 
Status: Retirement 
Age (Others) 
Individual's own Usual Retirement Age of Others at 
same firm/with same job if individual Head/Spouse. 
From Main Family File.  
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Table 32. Continued.  
Variable Description & Creation 
Expected Employment 
Status: Retirement 
Age (Self) 
 Individual's own Age Plan to Stop working if "Actual 
age" given and if individual Head/Spouse.  Missing if 
"Never Retire." From Main Family File.   
Never Expects to 
Retire 
Created from Age Plan to Stop Working for 
Head/Spouse. =1  if individual responds "never" for 
age plan to stop working; =0 if actual age given. From 
Main Family File.  
Retire Gap 
 
Distance between the usual retirement age at a firm 
("Usual Employment Status: Retirement Age ") and 
expected retirement for individual ("Expected 
Employment Status: Retirement Age "). Postive if 
individual expects to retire before the usual retirement 
age at a firm; negative if the individual expects to 
retire after the usual retirement age at a firm. Ex: -6 
indicates an individual believes they'll retire 6 years 
after the typical retirement age at their firm.  
Employment Status: 
Retired 
 
If Individual Retired. From Individual Employment 
Status. IndEmp =1 if Employment Status =4(retired); 
IndEmp =0 if Employment Status  =1 (Working Now), 
=2(Only temporarily laid off), =3(looking for work, 
unemployed), =5(permanently disabled), 
=6(HouseSpouse), =7(Student) =8(Other). From 
Individual Data File. 
Employment Status: 
Not in the Labor Force 
 
If Individual Not in the Labor Force. From Individual 
Employment Status. =1 if Employment Status 
=4(retired), =5(permanently disabled), 
=6(HouseSpouse), =7(Student). =0 if Employment 
Status =1(working now), =2(only temporarily laid off), 
= 3(looking for work, unemployed) =8(Other). From 
Individual Data File. 
Employment Status: 
Unemployed 
 
If Individual Unemployed. From Individual 
Employment Status. IndEmp =1 if Employment Status 
=3(looking for work, unemployed) ; IndEmp =0 if 
Employment Status  =1 (Working Now), =2(Only 
temporarily laid off), =4(retired), =5(permanently 
disabled), =6(HouseSpouse), =7(Student) =8(Other). 
From Individual Data File. 
Employment Status: 
Employed 
 
From Individual Employment Status. IndEmp =1 if 
Employment Status =1 (Working Now); IndEmp =0 if 
Unemployed = 1 or Not in Labor Force = 1. From 
Individual Data File. 
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Table 32. Continued.  
Variable Description & Creation 
Real 2015 Dollars in 
IRA/Annuities 
 
From Imputed Value in Annuity/IRA. Made "real IRA 
Value" by Inflation-adjustment to 2015 dollars. From 
Main Family File. 
Whether Anyone in 
Family has 
IRA/Annuities 
 
 =1 if Imputed Value IRA > 0; =0 if Imputed Value 
IRA = 0.  From Main Family File. 
Age Individual's age. From Individual Data File. 
Social Security 
Eligibility 
 
=1 if individual's age >= 62; =0 otherwise. 
Spouse Present 
 
Spouse Present, derived from Couple Status of Head. 
Spouse Present=1 if Couple Status of Head = 1 (Head 
with wife present in FU), =2 (Head with partner 
present in FU), = 3 (Head (female) with husband 
present in FU), = 4 (Head with first-year cohabitor 
present in FU).  SpsPrsnt = 0 if Couple Status of Head 
= 5(Head with no wife, partner, husband, or first-year 
cohabitor present in FU). From Main Family File.  
Real Assets in 2015 $s 
 
Real Imputed Assets. Created by adding "imputed 
wealth with home equity" and "imputed debts" 
together. (ie, undoing the transformation of wealth = 
assets - debt). "Imputed debts" is from the Main 
Family file; in 2011, 2013, and 2015, when debts were 
separated out into categories, we add those categories 
together to create a total as in prior PSID surveys (for 
2011, imputed debts = credit card + student loan + 
medical debt + legal debt + loans from family; in 2013 
and 2015, imputed debts = credit card + student loan 
+ medical debt + legal debt + loans from family + farm 
debt + real estate debt + other debt). Transformed into 
real 2015 dollars.  
Financial Literacy 
(Scale = 0-6) 
 
Number out of 6 questions about financial literacy that 
an individual got correct. From 2016 Well-Being 
Survey. 
Mother’s Education 
 
Mother's latest education available from survey, 
categorical (1 = 0-5 grades, 2 = 6-8 grades, 3 = 9-11 
grades, 4 = 12 grades, 5 = 12 grades & some 
nonacademic training, 6 = some college, 7 = BA, 8 = 
advanced degree) 
Health Status 
 
Individual's own Health Status if individual 
Head/Spouse.  
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Table 32. Continued.  
Variable Description & Creation 
Household Income 
Less Own Labor 
Income in 2015 $s 
 
Real household income less individual parent's own 
labor income. "Household income" is "Total Family 
Income [previous year]" from Main Family data.  
Restrict this to positive values only. Because we want 
Total Family Income in survey years, if the referenced 
year is between 1996 and 2014, we impute the survey 
year's Total Famly Income as (1/2)Previous Year's 
Total Family Income + (1/2)Next Year's Total Family 
Income. (This means we lose 2015, for which there is 
no next year of data available.) "Own labor income" is 
either "Labor Income [2 Years Previous] for 
Head/Spouse" (2015 - 2003) or "Labor Income [1 Year 
Previous] for Head/Spouse" (2001 - 1983).  
This leaves 1999 and 1997 with labor income 
information because in 2001 and 1999, information 
was collected for 2000 and 1998, respectfully. Impute 
these year's as LaborIncome in Current Year = (1/2) 
Labor Income in Previous Year + (1/2)Labor Income 
Next Year. (ie, 1999's labor income is (1/2) 2000's 
labor income and (1/2) 1998's labor income). Subtract 
individual's own labor income from household 
income; transform into real 2015 dollars. Because 
2015 is unavailable, 2013's is used for individual's 
whose reference year is 2015. 
Number of Children 
Matched in College 
 
Number of children in college a parent was 
successfully matched with in the data. 
White 
Individual's self-identified race for Heads/Spouses, 
from Main Family Survey. White =1 if Race of 
Head/Spouse Mention #1 = 1(White). White = 0 if 
Race of Head/Spouse Mention #1 = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7.  
Black 
Individual's self-identified race for Heads/Spouses, 
from Main Family Survey. Black =1 if Race of 
Head/Spouse Mention #1 = 2(Black, African-
American, or Negro). Black = 0 if Race of 
Head/Spouse Mention #1 = 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7. 
Other Race 
Individual's self-identified race for Heads/Spouses, 
from Main Family Survey. Other Race =1 if Race of 
Head/Spouse Mention #1 = 3(American Indian or 
Alaska Native), =4 (Asian), =5 (Native Hawaiian or 
Pacific Islander), =7 (Other).  Other Race = 0 if Race 
of Head/Spouse Mention #1 = 1 or 2.  
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Table 32. Continued.  
Variable Description & Creation 
Total Years of College 
for All Children 
 
Total years of college all of a parent's children 
attended; total of a variable for each child called Years 
in College. For each child, if "First College Entrance 
Year" used is from Main Family data, Years In College 
is Main Family's " Highest Year in College for 
Head/Spouse" (if child Head/Spouse). If "First College 
Entrance Year" from Transition to Adulthood data,  
from TA's "Grade Level Completed" (GLC); "Years In 
College" =1 if GLC = 14 (One Year college); = 2 if GLC 
=15 (two years college); = 3 if GLC = 15 (three years 
college); = 4 if GLC = 16; = 5 if GLC = 17. If "Grade 
Level Completed" not available for individual where 
"First College Entrance Year" is from TA data, then a 
proxy created from TA data of "First College Entrance 
Year" - 2013 (if individual currently attending school 
in 2013) or "First College Entrance Year" - 2011 (if 
individual data not available for 2013 and individual 
currently attending school in 2011). This proxy is 
topcoded at 5 so it matches the other data used to 
create Years In College.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 77 
 
Appendix C 
 
Table 33. The Effect of Any Student Loan Debt on Retirement Expectations, All 
Coefficients Except State and Year Fixed Effects Included. 
  
Retirement 
Gap 
Others' Usual 
Retirement 
Age for Same 
Job 
Age Expected 
to Retire 
(Self) 
Never 
Expects to 
Retire 
Any Student 
Loans 
-0.433 1.13 0.888 0.024 
 (0.81) (0.78) (0.58) (0.04) 
Mother 0.9 -0.271 -0.541 -0.035 
 (0.74) (0.72) (0.50) (0.04) 
Black 1.184 -1.765 -0.801 -0.04 
 (1.15) (1.22) (0.71) (0.06) 
Other Race -1.064 1.296 -0.645 0.068 
 (1.07) (1.45) (0.68) (0.06) 
Hispanic 0.541 -1.323 -0.684 -0.072 
 (1.21) (1.25) (0.77) (0.05) 
Household 
Income Less 
Own Labor 
Income 
-0.045 -0.082 -0.057** -0.002 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.00) 
Age 0.105 0.169** 0.215*** -0.001 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) -0.004 
Spouse Present -0.08 -1.444 -1.809*** -0.045 
 (0.94) (0.97) (0.61) (0.05) 
Assets in 2015  -0.008*** 0.006* -0.002 0 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 0.00 
Social Security 
Eligibility 
1.617* 0.221 1.502** 0.098* 
 (0.96) (0.96) (0.67) (0.06) 
Number of 
Children in 
College 
0.425 0.132 1.096** 0.018 
 (0.83) (0.78) (0.49) (0.04) 
Some Children 
Went to HBCU 
-4.192*** 3.606* -1.084 -0.181** 
 (1.57) (1.91) (1.53) (0.08) 
All Children 
Attended 
HBCU 
-1.349 1.046 0.112 -0.107 
 (1.36) (1.60) (1.24) (0.08) 
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Table 33. Continued.  
  
Retirement 
Gap 
Others' Usual 
Retirement 
Age for Same 
Job 
Age Expected 
to Retire 
(Self) 
Never 
Expects to 
Retire 
Some Children 
Attended 
Private College 
0.04 -1.976* -1.011 0.528*** 
 (0.96) (1.03) (1.35) (0.10) 
All Children 
Attended 
Private College 
-0.527 1.838** 1.134* 0.084 
 (0.75) (0.82) (0.67) (0.05) 
Some Children 
Attended For-
Profit College 
0.361 0.533 1.002 0.383*** 
 (2.72) (2.32) (1.11) (0.09) 
All Children 
Attended For-
Profit College 
-2.304* 0.663 -1.302* 0.149* 
 (1.29) (1.21) (0.72) (0.09) 
Some Children 
Attended Four-
Year College 
-0.895 0.555 -1.317* -0.06 
 (1.37) (1.18) (0.74) (0.06) 
All Children 
Attended Four-
Year College 
-0.023 0.115 -0.444 0.002 
 (0.90) (0.82) (0.54) (0.04) 
Total Years 
Children in 
College 
-0.082 0.105 0.032 -0.003 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.10) (0.01) 
Health Status: 
Very Good 
0.367 -0.082 1.072* -0.025 
 (0.89) (0.96) (0.63) (0.05) 
Health Status: 
Good 
-0.476 -0.101 0.185 -0.066 
 (0.99) (1.02) (0.66) (0.04) 
Health Status: 
Fair 
0.469 -0.461 -0.182 -0.006 
 (1.16) (1.09) (0.75) (0.06) 
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Table 33. Continued.  
  
Retirement 
Gap 
Others' Usual 
Retirement 
Age for Same 
Job 
Age Expected 
to Retire 
(Self) 
Never 
Expects to 
Retire 
Health Status: 
Poor 
-1.868 0.664 1.128 0.151 
 (2.02) (1.56) (1.37) (0.15) 
R2 0.27 0.31 0.37 0.18 
N 401 418 691 761 
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Table 34. The Effect of Any Student Loan Debt on Employment Status, All 
Coefficients Except State and Year Fixed Effects Included. 
 Retired 
Not in Labor 
Force 
Unemployed Employed 
Any Student 
Loans 
-0.035 -0.054* -0.016 0.055* 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Mother 0.027 0.070* 0.018 -0.063 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
Black -0.023 -0.014 -0.02 0.015 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
Other Race -0.146*** -0.123** 0.013 0.111** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) 
Hispanic 0.026 0.022 0 -0.023 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) 
Household 
Income Less 
Own Labor 
Income 
0.003 0.003 0 -0.003 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age 0.010*** 0.006* -0.001 -0.005 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Spouse 
Present 
-0.04 -0.071* -0.003 0.076* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
Assets in 2015 0 0 0 0 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Social 
Security 
Eligibility 
0.112** 0.121** 0 -0.133*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
Number of 
Children in 
College 
0 -0.012 -0.007 0.012 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Some Children 
Went to 
HBCU 
-0.044 -0.115 0.018 0.113 
 (0.10) (0.13) (0.03) (0.12) 
All Children 
Attended 
HBCU 
-0.011 -0.028 0.019 0.024 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08) 
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Table 34. Continued. 
  Retired 
Not in Labor 
Force 
Unemployed Employed 
Some Children 
Attended 
Private 
College 
-0.154* -0.144 0.055 0.131 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.05) (0.11) 
All Children 
Attended 
Private 
College 
-0.064* -0.082* -0.034** 0.082* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
Some Children 
Attended For-
Profit College 
-0.122* 0.046 0.053 -0.049 
 (0.07) (0.10) (0.05) (0.10) 
All Children 
Attended For-
Profit College 
0.077 0.061 -0.014 -0.055 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) 
Some Children 
Attended 
Four-Year 
College 
-0.022 -0.104 -0.047** 0.110* 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) 
All Children 
Attended 
Four-Year 
College 
0.044 0.024 -0.015 -0.015 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
Total Years 
Children in 
College 
0.007 0.006 0 -0.005 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Health Status: 
Very Good 
-0.055 -0.059 -0.003 0.062 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) 
Health Status: 
Good 
0.018 0.058 0.027 -0.056 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
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Table 34. Continued.  
  Retired 
Not in Labor 
Force 
Unemployed Employed 
Health Status: 
Fair 
0.049 0.161** 0.011 -0.170** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) 
Health Status: 
Poor 
-0.013 0.159 0.099 -0.194 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.07) (0.12) 
R2 0.37 0.3 0.14 0.3 
N 771 771 771 771 
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Table 35. The Effect of Any Student Loan Debt on Retirement Savings, All 
Coefficients Except State and Year Fixed Effects Included. 
  
Real 2015 Dollars in 
IRA/Annuities 
Whether Anyone in 
Family has 
IRA/Annuities 
Any Student Loans -7.004** -0.074 
 (3.03) (0.06) 
Mother 0.611 -0.027 
 (3.43) (0.05) 
Black -4.649* -0.129* 
 (2.79) (0.07) 
Other Race -2.133 -0.017 
 (5.71) (0.07) 
Hispanic -8.723* -0.253*** 
 (4.52) (0.07) 
Household Income Less 
Own Labor Income 
0.598* 0.011*** 
 (0.34) (0.00) 
Age -0.138 0.013*** 
 (0.30) (0.01) 
Spouse Present 0.897 -0.001 
 (2.58) (0.05) 
Assets in 2015 (Less 
IRA/Annuities) 
0.067*** 0 
 (0.02) 0.00 
Social Security Eligibility 10.603* 0.047 
 (5.57) (0.07) 
Number of Children in 
College 
-2.32 -0.105** 
 (3.52) (0.05) 
Some Children Went to 
HBCU 
-8.928 -0.210** 
 (6.99) (0.11) 
All Children Attended 
HBCU 
-1.572 -0.129 
 (5.12) (0.10) 
Some Children Attended 
Private College 
-3.601 -0.286** 
 (8.90) (0.12) 
All Children Attended 
Private College 
3.681 0.068 
 (4.87) (0.06) 
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Table 35. Continued.  
  
Real 2015 Dollars in 
IRA/Annuities 
Whether Anyone in 
Family has 
IRA/Annuities 
Some Children Attended 
For-Profit College 
-13.350* -0.336*** 
 (7.14) (0.10) 
All Children Attended 
For-Profit College 
1.456 -0.036 
 (3.98) (0.08) 
Some Children Attended 
Four-Year College 
0.317 0.096 
 (4.33) (0.07) 
All Children Attended 
Four-Year College 
4.522 0.059 
 (3.39) (0.06) 
Total Years Children in 
College 
1.357** 0.025*** 
 (0.54) (0.01) 
Health Status: Very 
Good 
5.125 -0.029 
 (4.92) (0.06) 
Health Status: Good -1.258 -0.107* 
 (4.88) (0.06) 
Health Status: Fair -3.851 -0.113 
 (4.87) (0.07) 
Health Status: Poor -12.030* -0.209* 
 (6.25) (0.11) 
R2 0.37 0.35 
N 767 767 
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Table 36. The Effect of the Amount of Student Loan Debt on Retirement 
Expectations, All Coefficients Except State and Year Fixed Effects Included. 
  
Retirement 
Gap 
Others' 
Usual 
Retirement 
Age for 
Same Job 
Age Expected 
to Retire 
(Self) 
Never 
Expects to 
Retire 
Student Loans 
(Tens of 
Thousands of 2015 
$’s) 
-0.041 0.159 0.376** 0.001 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.16) (0.01) 
Mother 0.881 -0.214 -0.532 -0.039 
 (0.73) (0.72) (0.50) (0.04) 
Black 1.175 -1.717 -0.572 -0.039 
 (1.14) (1.20) (0.71) (0.06) 
Other Race -0.957 1.166 -0.572 0.075 
 (1.14) (1.54) (0.70) (0.07) 
Hispanic 0.606 -1.396 -0.65 -0.064 
 (1.28) (1.34) (0.77) (0.05) 
Household Income 
Less Own Labor 
Income 
-0.046 -0.079 -0.053* -0.002 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.00) 
Age 0.107 0.167** 0.212*** -0.001 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.00) 
Spouse Present -0.14 -1.375 -1.868*** -0.05 
 (0.95) (0.97) (0.63) (0.05) 
Assets in 2015  -0.008** 0.006* -0.002 0 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 0.00 
Social Security 
Eligibility 
1.58 0.288 1.557** 0.100* 
 (0.97) (0.98) (0.65) (0.06) 
Number of 
Children in 
College 
0.442 0.143 1.139** 0.012 
 (0.84) (0.78) (0.48) (0.04) 
Some Children 
Went to HBCU 
-4.099*** 3.340* -1.334 -0.176** 
 (1.52) (1.92) (1.52) (0.09) 
All Children 
Attended HBCU 
-1.354 1.043 0.028 -0.112 
 (1.37) (1.56) (1.20) (0.08) 
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Table 36. Continued.  
  
Retirement 
Gap 
Others' 
Usual 
Retirement 
Age for 
Same Job 
Age Expected 
to Retire 
(Self) 
Never 
Expects to 
Retire 
Some Children 
Attended 
Private 
College 
-0.001 -1.890* -1.054 0.522*** 
 (0.97) (1.02) (1.35) (0.10) 
All Children 
Attended 
Private 
College 
-0.449 1.720** 1.242* 0.092* 
 (0.76) (0.83) (0.68) (0.05) 
Some Children 
Attended For-
Profit College 
0.3 0.575 1.118 0.387*** 
 (2.76) (2.29) (1.10) (0.09) 
All Children 
Attended For-
Profit College 
-2.260* 0.552 -1.371* 0.150* 
 (1.30) (1.26) (0.76) (0.09) 
Some Children 
Attended 
Four-Year 
College 
-0.854 0.436 -1.463** -0.055 
 (1.36) (1.17) (0.72) (0.06) 
Some Children 
Attended 
Four-Year 
College 
-0.854 0.436 -1.463** -0.055 
 (1.36) (1.17) (0.72) (0.06) 
All Children 
Attended 
Four-Year 
College 
-0.036 0.132 -0.578 0.005 
 (0.90) (0.83) (0.52) (0.04) 
Total Years 
Children in 
College 
-0.078 0.093 0.021 -0.003 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.10) (0.01) 
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Table 36. Continued.  
  
Retirement 
Gap 
Others' 
Usual 
Retirement 
Age for 
Same Job 
Age Expected 
to Retire 
(Self) 
Never 
Expects to 
Retire 
Health Status: 
Very Good 
0.364 -0.075 1.178* -0.026 
 (0.89) (0.96) (0.63) (0.05) 
Health Status: 
Good 
-0.503 -0.021 0.236 -0.063 
 (1.00) (1.02) (0.65) (0.05) 
Health Status: 
Fair 
0.471 -0.519 0.038 0.003 
 (1.16) (1.11) (0.74) (0.06) 
Health Status: 
Poor 
-1.813 0.518 1.286 0.148 
 (2.01) (1.49) (1.45) (0.15) 
R2 0.27 0.31 0.39 0.19 
N 400 417 687 756 
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Table 37. The Effect of the Amount of Student Loan Debt on Retirement 
Expectations, All Coefficients Except State and Year Fixed Effects Included. 
  Retired 
Not in Labor 
Force 
Unemployed Employed 
Student Loans 
(Tens of 
Thousands of 
2015 $’s) 
-0.004 -0.005 -0.001 0.005 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Mother 0.026 0.070* 0.018 -0.063 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
Black -0.025 -0.017 -0.021 0.018 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
Other Race -0.149*** -0.122** 0.014 0.110** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) 
Hispanic 0.026 0.022 0 -0.023 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) 
Household 
Income Less Own 
Labor Income 
0.003 0.003 0 -0.003 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age 0.010*** 0.007* -0.001 -0.006 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Spouse Present -0.04 -0.078* -0.004 0.082* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
Assets in 2015  0 0 0 0 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Social Security 
Eligibility 
0.110** 0.119** 0 -0.130** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
Number of 
Children in 
College 
-0.004 -0.011 -0.008 0.011 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Some Children 
Went to HBCU 
-0.037 -0.113 0.021 0.11 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.03) (0.12) 
All Children 
Attended HBCU 
-0.015 -0.036 0.016 0.032 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08) 
Some Children 
Attended Private 
College 
-0.155* -0.142 0.055 0.129 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.05) (0.11) 
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Table 37. Continued.  
  Retired 
Not in Labor 
Force 
Unemployed Employed 
All Children 
Attended 
Private College 
-0.066* -0.076* -0.033* 0.075* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
Some Children 
Attended For-
Profit College 
-0.118* 0.06 0.056 -0.063 
 (0.07) (0.10) (0.05) (0.10) 
All Children 
Attended For-
Profit College 
0.082 0.075 -0.014 -0.069 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) 
Some Children 
Attended Four-
Year College 
-0.02 -0.101 -0.046* 0.107 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) 
All Children 
Attended Four-
Year College 
0.044 0.023 -0.015 -0.014 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
Total Years 
Children in 
College 
0.008 0.006 0 -0.005 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Health Status: 
Very Good 
-0.056 -0.062 -0.003 0.064 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) 
Health Status: 
Good 
0.016 0.051 0.027 -0.049 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
Health Status: 
Fair 
0.048 0.160** 0.012 -0.169** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) 
Health Status: 
Poor 
-0.014 0.153 0.099 -0.188 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.07) (0.12) 
R2 0.37 0.3 0.14 0.3 
N 763 763 763 763 
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Table 38. The Effect of the Amount of Student Loan Debt on Retirement Savings, 
All Coefficients Except State and Year Fixed Effects Included. 
  
Real 2015 Dollars in 
IRA/Annuities 
Whether Anyone in 
Family has 
IRA/Annuities 
Student Loans (Tens of 
Thousands of 2015 $’s) 
-1.411** -0.013 
 (0.59) (0.01) 
Mother 0.452 -0.022 
 (3.49) (0.05) 
Black -5.573** -0.135** 
 (2.79) (0.07) 
Other Race -2.264 -0.02 
 (5.81) (0.07) 
Hispanic -9.301** -0.258*** 
 (4.64) (0.07) 
Household Income Less 
Own Labor Income 
0.603* 0.011*** 
 (0.34) (0.00) 
Age -0.156 0.014*** 
 (0.30) (0.01) 
Spouse Present 0.936 0.002 
 (2.61) (0.06) 
Assets in 2015 (Less 
IRA/Annuities) 
0.068*** 0 
 (0.02) 0.00 
Social Security Eligibility 10.682* 0.047 
 (5.55) (0.07) 
Number of Children in 
College 
-2.213 -0.101** 
 (3.66) (0.05) 
Some Children Attended 
HBCU 
-7.844 -0.202* 
 (6.87) (0.10) 
All Children Attended 
HBCU 
-2.056 -0.128 
 (4.98) (0.10) 
Some Children Attended 
Private College 
-2.922 -0.282** 
 (8.87) (0.12) 
All Children Attended 
Private College 
3.61 0.056 
 (4.95) (0.06) 
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Table 38. Continued. 
  
Real 2015 Dollars in 
IRA/Annuities 
Whether Anyone in 
Family has 
IRA/Annuities 
Some Children Attended 
For-Profit College 
-12.815* -0.339*** 
 (7.11) (0.10) 
All Children Attended 
For-Profit College 
1.503 -0.036 
 (3.89) (0.08) 
Some Children Attended 
Four-Year College 
0.65 0.098 
 (4.31) (0.07) 
All Children Attended 
Four-Year College 
4.876 0.06 
 (3.40) (0.06) 
Total Years Children in 
College 
1.315** 0.025*** 
 (0.55) (0.01) 
Health Status: Very 
Good 
5.104 -0.029 
 (4.90) (0.06) 
Health Status: Good -1.264 -0.108* 
 (4.87) (0.06) 
Health Status: Fair -3.832 -0.126* 
 (4.92) (0.07) 
Health Status: Poor -12.120* -0.207* 
 (6.28) (0.11) 
R2 0.37 0.35 
N 759 759 
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Appendix D 
 
Table 39. Effect of Lottery Scholarship Availability on Debt; College Exit Year 
Less Years College Completed Used as College Entrance Year, All Coefficients 
Except State and Year Fixed Effects.  
  
Any Other 
Debt 
Amount Real 
Other Debt 
(2015) 
Log of Amount Real Other 
Debt (2015)  (=0 if Amount 
of Real Other Debt =0) 
Scholarship 
Available 
-0.00666 -1,801 -0.174 
 (0.07) (3447.00) (0.70) 
Distance between 
College Exit and 
Survey 
0.0104 308.9 0.135 
 (0.01) (576.80) (0.13) 
Father's 
Education: High 
School Graduate, 
No Bachelor's 
Degree 
0.0447 -1,398 0.313 
 (0.04) (1996.00) (0.38) 
Father's 
Education: 
College Graduate 
or Higher 
-0.0123 -2,503 -0.392 
 (0.04) (2311.00) (0.41) 
Race: Black -0.0105 476.7 0.346 
 (0.04) (2092.00) (0.37) 
Race: Other Race -0.216** -5,217** -1.799** 
 (0.09) (2501.00) (0.80) 
Age 0.0017 174.6 0.0205 
 (0.00) (108.10) (0.02) 
Female 0.0158 887.7 0.414* 
 (0.03) (1250.00) (0.24) 
Household Years 
in College 
0.00972* 2,824*** 0.301*** 
 (0.01) (300.40) (0.05) 
Constant 0.418** -7,360 2.504 
 (0.16) (6251.00) (1.61)     
Observations 1,735 1,735 1,735 
R-squared 0.114 0.17 0.097 
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Table 40. Effect of Lottery Scholarship Availability on Debt; High School 
Graduation Year Used as College Entrance Year, All Coefficients Except State and 
Year Fixed Effects. 
  
Any Other 
Debt 
Amount Real 
Other Debt 
(2015) 
Log of Amount 
Real Other 
Debt (2015)  
(=0 if Amount 
of Real Other 
Debt =0) 
   
 
Scholarship Available -0.0811 -4,920 -0.795 
 (0.10) (4474.00) (0.99) 
Distance between College 
Exit and Survey 
-0.00593 1,112 0.17 
 (0.02) (798.50) (0.17) 
Father's Education: High 
School Graduate, No 
Bachelor's Degree 
0.0208 -579 0.307 
 (0.06) (2827.00) (0.52) 
Father's Education: 
College Graduate or 
Higher 
-0.027 -2,552 -0.422 
 (0.06) (3163.00) (0.53) 
Race: Black -0.0532 747.5 0.0892 
 (0.05) (2666.00) (0.49) 
Race: Other Race -0.235** -7,659*** -1.554* 
 (0.10) (2177.00) (0.92) 
Age -0.00558 1,331*** 0.117*** 
 (0.01) (282.60) (0.04) 
Female -0.0153 -102.3 0.0647 
 (0.03) (1382.00) (0.27) 
Household Years in 
College 
0.0159*** 2,706*** 0.327*** 
 (0.01) (367.10) (0.06) 
Constant 0.797*** -42,330*** 1.02 
 (0.22) (9839.00) (2.10) 
    
Observations 1,325 1,325 1,325 
R-squared 0.14 0.198 0.127 
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